University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

5-2021

Towards Secure Deep Neural Networks for Cyber-Physical
Systems
Jiangnan Li
jli103@vols.utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the Other Computer Engineering Commons, and the Signal Processing Commons

Recommended Citation
Li, Jiangnan, "Towards Secure Deep Neural Networks for Cyber-Physical Systems. " PhD diss., University
of Tennessee, 2021.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/6657

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Jiangnan Li entitled "Towards Secure Deep
Neural Networks for Cyber-Physical Systems." I have examined the final electronic copy of this
dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Computer Engineering.
Jinyuan Sun, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Jinyuan Sun, Hairong Qi, Scott Ruoti, Lee D. Han
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Towards Secure Deep Neural
Networks for Cyber-Physical Systems

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Jiangnan Li
May 2021

© by Jiangnan Li, 2021
All Rights Reserved.

ii

Acknowledgments
I would like to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Jinyuan Sun, my advisor, for her patient
guidance, help, and advice throughout my whole graduate study. Her support and insightful
guidance are invaluable for me to complete this dissertation.
I wish to thank Dr. Hairong Qi, Dr. Scott Ruoti, and Dr. Lee D. Han for being on my
committee members, reading my dissertation, and providing meticulous advice to improve
the dissertation’s quality. Meanwhile, I gratefully appreciate the financial support from
CURENT and the Department of EECS of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my colleagues and classmates: Yingyuan Yang,
Xiangyu Niu, Eric Reinsmidt, Zhuo Yao, Yu Zhao, and Jin Young Lee for their help and
support during my study.

iii

Abstract
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly investigated in the literature
to be employed in cyber-physical systems (CPSs).

DNNs own inherent advantages in

complex pattern identifying and achieve state-of-the-art performances in many important
CPS applications. However, DNN-based systems usually require large datasets for model
training, which introduces new data management issues.

Meanwhile, research in the

computer vision domain demonstrated that the DNNs are highly vulnerable to adversarial
examples. Therefore, the security risks of employing DNNs in CPSs applications are of
concern.
In this dissertation, we study the security of employing DNNs in CPSs from both the
data domain and learning domain. For the data domain, we study the data privacy issues
of outsourcing the CPS data to cloud service providers (CSP). We design a space-efficient
searchable symmetric encryption scheme that allows the user to query keywords over the
encrypted CPS data that is stored in the cloud. After that, we study the security risks that
adversarial machine learning (AML) can bring to the CPSs. Based on the attacker properties,
we further separate AML in CPS into the customer domain and control domain. We analyze
the DNN-based energy theft detection in advanced meter infrastructure as an example for
customer domain attacks. The adversarial attacks to control domain CPS applications are
more challenging and stringent. We then propose ConAML, a general AML framework
that enables the attacker to generate adversarial examples under practical constraints. We
evaluate the framework with three CPS applications in transportation systems, power grids,
and water systems.
To mitigate the threat of adversarial attacks, more robust DNNs are required for critical
CPSs. We summarize the defense requirements for CPS applications and evaluate several
iv

typical defense mechanisms. For control domain adversarial attacks, we demonstrate that
defensive methods like adversarial detection are not capable due to the practical attack
requirements. We propose a random padding framework that can significantly increase the
DNN robustness under adversarial attacks. The evaluation results show that our padding
framework can reduce the effectiveness of adversarial examples in both customer domain and
control domain applications.

v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Motivation

In recent years, new computational techniques have been studied to be employed in cyberphysical systems (CPSs). For example, the legacy power grid is on its way to becoming
smart with diverse data-driven approaches. Smart grid, which introduces advancement in
sensing, monitoring, control, and communication to legacy grids, is considered to be the next
generation power grid that can provide high-quality service to the public [97]. The CPSs
of critical infrastructures in modern society are usually complex and consist of enormous
components. All these subsystems and components can become the sources of the large
volume of miscellaneous data. Some data sources in the smart grid are shown in Fig. 1.1.
Enabled by the vast volume of data, machine learning (ML), especially deep neural
networks (DNN), is increasingly studied in the research literature to be employed in
different CPS applications. The DNN-based approaches have intrinsic advantages in learning
the statistical patterns of the CPS data, which enables them to achieve state-of-the-art
performances in many important applications, such as load forecasting in power systems
[93, 51], energy theft detection of smart meters [116, 78, 49, 52, 119], incident detection
[40, 62, 115, 87, 86, 120], cyberattack detection [83, 111, 44, 47, 10, 81, 105]. In addition,
DNN systems are generally software-based and do not require extra equipment and device
upgrades, which makes them compatible with the current CPS infrastructure.

1

Figure 1.1: Data Sources in Smart Grid.

2

However, the deep learning techniques usually require large datasets to train DNN
models, which brings new requirements for data management. Recent research suggests
that the system operator outsource data management to third-part clouds for effectiveness
and economic reasons [11]. Since the data may contain sensitive information of the system,
the operator can encrypt the data before uploading them to the cloud. However, encryption
will sacrifice the user’s ability to query keywords over the data which is one of the common
operations in CPS data management. Therefore, an effective searchable encryption scheme
for CPS data is needed.
Meanwhile, as the DNN model parameters are automatically discovered during the
learning process through back-propagation, DNN is considered as a black-box technique
whose resulting computation is difficult to interpret, which brings great risk to employ
the trained models in crucial applications, such as cyberattack detection in CPSs. Recent
research on adversarial machine learning (AML) has demonstrated that well-trained DNN
models are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. With the related AML algorithms, the
attacker will be able to generate adversarial examples that deceive the DNN models to output
the wrong results. Meanwhile, the same adversarial perturbations are transferable between
different DNN models even the models are trained with different datasets and have different
structures. Therefore, the potential vulnerabilities that adversarial attacks can bring to
the CPSs need to be studied. However, the majority of AML research is conducted in the
computer vision domain. Due to the inherent properties of the CPS applications, the widelyused threat model in previous AML research and state-of-the-art AML algorithms may
become impractical, and new AML frameworks that are compatible with CPS applications
are needed.
This dissertation mainly studies the power systems as the example of CPS applications,
we also discuss other CPS applications, such as anomaly detection in water treatment
systems, as different study cases to demonstrate the properties of our proposed approaches.

3

1.2
1.2.1

Challenges
Efficient Searchable Symmetric Encryption Scheme

Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE), which allows the user to query keywords over the
cipher-text, draws attention in the cryptography research communities and several state-ofthe-art SSE algorithms were proposed [94, 33, 17, 22]. However, the previous algorithms
were designed for general plaintext encryption and may be inefficient for the CPSs data
that was used as the DNN datasets. There are two properties that make the CPS data
special for SSE. First, the data generated in the CPS applications, such as the smart grid,
is frequently updated and owns a high generation rate. The newly generated data (i.e. new
sensor measurements, new customer profiles) indicates that there are always new keywords
generated, which makes the keyword dictionary-based SSE schemes impractical. In addition,
different from the general plaintext, such as an email, the data generated by different
CPS applications is usually well-regulated and follows specific structures. For example,
the datasets used for DNN model training usually have constant feature numbers and the
data of each feature owns the same data type. This property should be taken advantage of
to design efficient SSE schemes for the CPS application.

1.2.2

Adversarial Attack and Defense in Cyber-Physical Systems

The adversarial attacks targeting DL applications in CPS can be quite different from attacks
in pure cyberspace applications. For example, in the computer vision domain, the adversarial
perturbations added to the legitimate input images should be as small as possible in order to
avoid being noticed by human eyes, which is not applicable for CPS applications. In fact, the
requirements of adversarial attacks in CPSs can also be different for different DL applications
according to the attacker’s resource, attack goals, and practical physical constraints. For
example, DNN-based energy theft detection based on smart meter data has been studied
in recent literature and achieves high detection accuracy [119, 78, 46, 70]. If an energy
thief aims to steal energy by reporting false smart meter measurements to the utilities to
make profit, she/he will need to focus on the total measurements instead of the divergent
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(perturbation) between the real measurements and reported (adversarial) measurements.
Currently, although there is research that studies adversarial attacks in CPSs [19, 65], it
does not consider practical threat models and the specific attack requirements. Meanwhile,
the defense mechanisms to mitigate the adversarial attacks in the CPSs have not been
investigated.

1.3

Outline

The structure of this dissertation can be summarized as follow:
• In chapter 2, based on the properties of CPS data, we design an efficient searchable
encryption scheme for CPS applications and achieves high space-efficiency. We implement a prototype based on the statistical data of advanced metering infrastructure in
power systems to show the effectiveness of our approach.
• In chapter 3, we study the adversarial attacks in the customer domain of CPS. We
investigate the vulnerability of the DNN-based energy theft detection and demonstrate
that the well-perform DL models for energy theft detection are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks. We design an adversarial measurement generation algorithm that enables the
attacker to report extremely low power consumption measurements to the utilities while
bypassing the DNN energy theft detection. The algorithm is evaluated with three kinds
of neural networks based on a real-world smart meter dataset. The evaluation result
demonstrates that our approach is able to significantly decrease the DNN models’
detection accuracy, even for black-box attackers.
• In chapter 4, for the control system domain of CPS, we propose Constrained
Adversarial Machine Learning (ConAML), a general AML framework for CPSs.
We first summarize several practical constraints of AML in CPSs and formulate
the mathematical model of ConAML by incorporating the physical constraints of
the underlying system. We then design a series of AML algorithms that generate
adversarial examples under the corresponding constraints. We evaluate the ConAML
framework with three CPS applications, the incident detection in transportation
5

systems, the false data injection attack (FDIA) detection in power grid state estimation
and the anomaly detection in water treatment systems. The evaluation results show
that the adversarial examples generated by our algorithms can effectively bypass the
DNN-powered attack detection systems.
• In chapter 5, we study the defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks in CPS. We
analyze and evaluate several state-of-the-art adversarial defense mechanisms, such as
adversarial training and adversarial detection, and demonstrate that they have intrinsic
limitations for adversarial prevention in control domain adversarial attacks. We then
design a robust DNN detection framework for FDIA by introducing random input
padding in both the training and inference phases. We evaluate our framework with
energy theft detection and FDIA detection. The results show that our framework
greatly reduces the effectiveness of adversary examples in both customer domain and
control domain applications.

6

Chapter 2
Space-Efficient SSE for CPSs
2.1

Introduction

Many cyber-physical systems (CPSs), such as the power grids, are critical infrastructure
that contains miscellaneous data resources. Due to the divergence in structure, type and
generation rate, how to integrate, store, and manage the data is still one of the active
research fields in the research community. Recently, research on remote cloud-based storage
and management of CPS data is becoming popular [11]. Arenas-Martinez et al. [7] presented
and compared a series of cloud-based architectures to store and process smart meter reading
data. Based on the specific characteristics of smart grid data, Rusitschka et al. [90] proposed
a cloud computing model of ubiquitous data storage and access. In fact, outsourcing the
data storage to the cloud can be an effective solution and has advantages in scalability,
performance, and interoperability.
The cloud frameworks in [7] [90] work well when the CPS data owners own private cloud
servers and or the cloud service is completely trusted. However, due to economic reasons,
the utility company who owns the CPS data may choose to outsource the data storage to
third-party cloud service providers (CSP). In this scenario, the cloud in the models becomes
untrusted, and there is a privacy concern about the CPS data. Technically speaking, since
the data are stored in the CSP’s server, the provider can obtain full access to all the sensitive
data easily. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the CSP may be interested in these
data for many reasons. For example, the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) data in
7

the smart grid can contain customers’ personal information, such as hourly measured power
consumption, home location, and payment record. By launching side-channel attacks, such
as Non-intrusive load monitoring [41], it is possible for the CPS to learn the customer’s
habits and customs, which may bring profit to CPS in many ways.
One straightforward approach to prevent storage CPS from accessing sensitive data in the
CPS is encrypting the data before uploading them to the cloud. While encryption provides
confidentiality to the data, it also sacrifices the functionalities of processing the data. One
of the most critical functions of processing data stored in the remote server is searching. For
example, a utility company wants to query the billing statement of a specific customer. If
the documents are encrypted with the concern of privacy, the CPS can no longer provide the
search function to the utility company. In fact, this is a common problem that not only exists
in the CPS field but also in all cloud storage applications that require privacy enhancement.
With the development of privacy-preserving technology, Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) was proposed to address the above problem. SSE is technology that enables users
to store documents in ciphertext form while keeping the functionality to search keywords in
their documents. In recent years, a series of secure and efficient SSE schemes are proposed
[94, 33, 17, 22, 50, 74, 68, 39, 14, 60]. However, most of them are only focusing on general
circumstances in which user’s documents are collections of random keyword combination,
and can become inefficient or over-protect when directly applying them to CPS applications,
such as smart grid.
There are two characteristics that make CPS data special. Firstly, CPS data are believed
to be frequently updated and have a high generation rate. This also implies there are
always new data/keywords generated, which will lead to an increasing keyword dictionary.
Furthermore, a large portion of CPS data are well regulated and have specific structures.
In practice, CPS data may contain multiple attributes that will be searched as keywords.
For example, although two utility companies may have different implementations of storing
customer billing statements, it is reasonable to assume both implementations should have
keywords such as user identity, electricity price, smart meter reading in each record. This
assumption is also practical for the datasets used for ML applications in the CPS since the
datasets are generally well-regulated and each record in the dataset contains the same number
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of features. The two characteristics make the state-of-the-art SSE schemes inappropriate to
be applied to CPS applications. The typical SSE schemes together with their disadvantages
with the above two characteristics will be discussed in Section 2.2.
The contributions of this chapter are summarised as follow:
• We review and analyze the typical state-of-the-art SSE schemes and show why they
are inappropriate for CPS data.
• According to the characteristics of CPS data, we design a simple, practical SSE
scheme that provides higher space efficiency with tolerant information leakage in real
applications.
• We implement a prototype based on the statistic data of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) provided by U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) to show the
effectiveness of our scheme. We claim the scheme can also be applied to other types
of data in CPSs, such as metering data, customer billing statement, and PMU/PDC
data in smart grids.

2.1.1

Outlines

The rest of chapter is organized as follow. Section 2.2 gives the introduction of related
work on SSE. Section 2.3 introduces the threat model and notations we use. The detailed
description of our scheme will be presented in Section 2.4. After that, Section 2.5 introduces
the implementation of the prototype and smart grid data we use.

2.2

Related Work

Currently, the fundamental SSE constructions can be classified into three categories, namely
construction without indexes, construction with direct index, and construction with inverted
indexes.
The first practical SSE scheme without index construction was proposed by Song et al.
in 2000 [94]. They considered a document as a list of words with the same length and used
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a specially designed stream cipher to encrypt the document. However, this scheme requires
the server to traverse each document word by word, which leads to a search complexity linear
to the document size. Furthermore, the SSE scheme without index usually requires specially
developed encryption algorithms, making it unscalable to current CPS communication and
control systems. After that, several high impact index-based SSE schemes were proposed.
Secure Indexes by Goh [33] built Bloom Filters as the direct index. By adjusting the
parameters of the Bloom Filter, secure indexes can achieve efficient search complexity.
However, one inherent problem of Bloom Filter is that it will bring a false-positive rate, and
this can be unacceptable for critical infrastructure CPSs, such as the smart grid. Another
direct index-based scheme was presented by Chang et al. [17], and they built a large index
table for all documents to enable the efficient search. However, their scheme assumes that
there is a dictionary mapping all keywords to associate identifiers. As discussed in Section
2.1, the number of keywords in CPS data can be large and keep increasing. Therefore, the
scheme in [17] is also not appropriate for CPS applications. One of the most famous inverted
index based SSE schemes were proposed by Curtmola et al. [22]. They presented an indexing
scheme that achieves the highest time-efficient search function by using a uniquely designed
linked list data structure. However, an inverted index construction scheme has an inherent
problem, namely directly updating is difficult. Although a well-designed file management
system can mitigate the problem, inverted indexes are still not efficient for the CPS which
has new data generated all the time. The latest research work on SSE including dynamic
searchable encryption [50, 74, 68, 39], forward secure searchable encryption [14], and fuzzy
keyword searchable encryption [60].

2.3

Background

Besides the theoretical of the SSE scheme, research on applying SSE to solve real-world
problems is also active. In general, the SSE scheme can be used to all systems which include
storage outsourcing. Tong et al. [102] employed a modified SSE scheme of Secure Index [33]
and designed a secure data sharing mechanism for situational awareness in the power grid.
Their approach is also used to protect the privacy of e-health data [103]. The problem of
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health data privacy is drawing more and more attention. Li et al. [57] leveraged a secure
K-nearest neighbor (KNN) and attribute-based encryption to build a dynamic SSE scheme
for e-health data and achieves both forward and backward security. Other applications of
SSE can be found in [13].

2.3.1

Threat Model and Assumptions

Our scheme interacts between two parties. As shown in Fig. 2.1, we refer the party who
owns the data and wants to outsource the storage of data as the client, and the party
who provides the storage service as the server. The client uploads the encrypted data, and
associated search index to the server and sends query afterward. For simplicity, our scheme
only considers the case that there is one keyword contained in the query. We note that a
query that contains boolean operation on multiple keywords can be regarded as the operation
on query results of multiple single keywords, which will be briefly discussed at the end of this
section. After receiving the query contains keyword information from the client, the server
should run the SSE algorithms and return a list of the identifier of documents that contain
the keyword.
Same as most state-of-the-art SSE schemes, in our threat model we also assume that
the third party server is a curious but honest attacker, which means the cloud server should
provide normal cloud service but will try to learn the content of data. More specifically, the
server is not allowed to delete or modify the client’s data or share the data with other parties.
However, different from SSE schemes which assume that the client’s data is a collection of
random keyword combinations, our scheme makes practical assumptions on the client’s data
based on the characteristics of smart grid data.
First, we assume the CPS data to be stored in the cloud should be a collection of
records that have the same data structure and contain the same number of keywords. For
example, the customer billing statement record in advanced metering infrastructure should
have attributes like customer identifier, date, house location, smart meter readings, and
additional notes.
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Figure 2.1: General SSE Working Model.
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Another example can be the PMU data. One of the most widely used standards of PMU
data is IEEE C37.118.2 [1]. The standard gives the format of the application layer data
structure of PMU data that contains several attributes, such as data stream ID number,
time stamp, and measurement data. Moreover, as presented in [102], the data owner can
also design a hierarchical data structure to store the CPS data. Therefore, we believe this
assumption is practical in real CPS applications and is easy to meet. In the rest of the
chapter, we will use record and document interchangeably for simplicity.
Second, we assume the total number of records to be stored in the cloud is much larger
than the number of keywords in each record. In practice, a record may contain up to tens
of attributes, but it is normal for a utility company to maintain millions of customer data
records or billions of measurement data records.
One widely used security requirement of searchable symmetric encryption is IND2-CKA
secure proposed in [33]. In brief, IND2-CKA secure requires that the server cannot learn
anything more of the plaintext message except for the search result. According to IND2CKA, the number of keywords in each document should also be kept secret. However, our
scheme allows the number of keywords in each record to be known to the attacker (server).
There are mainly two practical reasons for this privacy sacrifice. First, SSE schemes follow
IND2-CKA secure consider the case that the client stores general documents which contain
keywords with random numbers. As we discussed above, since all CPS data records are
assumed to contain the same number of keywords, it is not reasonable to assume that the
attacker cannot learn the number in the real working scenario, like by social engineering
or just randomly guessing. Second, we will show that our scheme can achieve high space
efficiency by losing the restriction on this privacy leakage issue. This compromise should be
acceptable for a utility company or government department in practice.
Finally, the scheme is only used for constructing a secure search index. How to protect
the privacy of the plaintext data will not be discussed in this chapter. The client can use
popular security schemes like CBC or CTR block cipher to protect the confidentiality and
schemes like HMAC to protect the integrity of data.
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2.3.2

Notations

We use ∆ = {R1 , R2 ...R2d } to indicate a collection of records. N is defined to be the total
number of possible keywords in a record while n is the number of desired keywords in a
record that the client want to search, where n ≤ N . We use wi,j to denote the jth desired
keyword in record Rj where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. {0, 1}n is used to present the set of all
R

n bits numbers. K ← {0, 1}n means an element K being sampled uniformly from set {0, 1}n .
In addition, we use f : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}r to define a pseudo-random function that
maps a r bits number to another r number with a k bits key. A record’s identifier is defined
as id(R). Finally, we use h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}r to denote a hash function that maps random
length bitwise string to an r bits number.

2.4

Practical SSE Scheme Design For Cyber-Physical
Systems

2.4.1

Construction

Secure Indexes presented in [33] gives a framework of trapdoor based searchable symmetric
encryption scheme which was widely used by the follow-up research. In general, an SSE
should consist of four polynomial time algorithms:
• Keygen(s) is run by the client to generate a master private key M K where s is a
security parameter.
• Trapdoor(M K, w) is run by the client by taking the master key M K and a keyword
w as the input, and outputs the trapdoor Tw of word w.
• BuildIndex(R, M K) is run by the client by taking the master key M K and a record
R as the input, and outputs the index IR for record R.
• SearchIndex(Tw , IR ) is run by the server by taking a trapdoor Tw and a document’s
index IR as the input, and outputs 1 if w ∈ R or 0 otherwise.
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In general SSE scheme, the encrypted documents together with the associated indexes
will be kept by the server. When searching, the client generates the trapdoor Tw for word
w and send Tw to the server. For each record R, the server runs the SearchIndex(Tw , IR )
function and determine whether R contains w. The server will finally return to the client
a list of the identifiers of records which contain w. The framework requires that only the
client who holds the private master key M K can generate the trapdoor Tw for each word
w, such that the server cannot learn related information from the index. Our scheme also
follows this framework and is built in the direct index structure.
Our scheme uses a codeword array as the index for a record. For the keyword w, the
Trapdoor function computes the hash value h(w) of w, where h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}r , and
outputs the trapdoor Tw = fM K (h(w)), where f : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}r is a pseudorandom function. To build the index IRi of record Ri , the BuildIndex function calls
0

0

Trapdoor and computes the codeword Xi,j = fTwi,j (h(id(Ri ))), where f : {0, 1}r ×{0, 1}r →
{0, 1}r is another pseudo-random function. Each codeword Xi,j should be randomly written
into an n element array IRi , and this step can be done with a pseudo-random generator in
implementation. The detailed design of our scheme can be found in Fig. 3.
As discussed early in this section, we assume the CPS data ∆ to be a collection of records
with each record Ri contains N keywords. Considering the scenario that not all types of
keywords in the data are necessary for searching, and the data owner only wants to query
records by several specific types of keywords. For example, based on the standard IEEE
C37.118.2, the utility company may want to search PMU data records by ID number or
timestamp, and there may be no need to search by synchronization word. Therefore, our
scheme firstly allows the data owner to select the n (n ≤ N ) types of keywords she wants to
query based on specific applications.
After determining n types of keywords, the client should run function Keygen to obtain
a k bits master key M K and keep it secret. Subsequently, for each record Ri in ∆, the client
runs the BuildIndex function to obtain the index IRi of record R. Finally, the index IRi
should be attached to the encrypted record Ri and uploaded to the server.
To search for a keyword w, the client needs to compute the trapdoor Tw = fM K (h(w)) and
0

sends Tw to the server. After receiving the Tw , the server computes Xi,w = fTw (h(id(Ri )))
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R

• Keygen(k): Uniformly sample the master key M K ← {0, 1}k
• Trapdoor(M K, w): Given M K and keyword w, generate Tw = fM K (h(w)) of w
• BuildIndex(Ri , M K) : The input is a record Ri and the master key M K
The client:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

create an n elements array IRi and initialize all elements to zero
create an set U : {x ∈ Z|0 ≤ x ≤ n − 1}
for each desired keyword wi,j in Ri do
compute Twi,j = Trapdoor(M K, wi,j )
0
compute Xwi,j = fTwi,j (h(id(Ri )))
R

pick λ ← U , update U = U − {λ}
set IRi [λ] = Xi,j
end
return (Ri , Ii )

• Search(Tw , IR ) : Given Tw and IR return search result.
The server:
0

1
2
3
4
5
6

compute Xw = fTw (h(id(R)))
if Xw is in list IR then
return 1
else
return 0
end

Figure 2.2: Four Polynomial time functions
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for each ciphertext record Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ 2d ), and checks whether Xi,w is contained in IRi . If
so, the server returns id(Ri ) to the client.

2.4.2

Analysis and Comparison

As stated at the beginning of Section 2.3, our scheme aims to protect the data privacy such
that the adversary cannot learn any other information about the plaintext record from the
index except for the search result and the number of desired keywords in the record. We
analyze the security of our scheme from two aspects. First, considering a simple scenario
that only one index of a record is given, a polynomial-time attacker can not learn the original
keywords from the index. This is correct because if the attacker can learn the keyword from
the codeword, she will be able to break the pseudo-random function, which is contradictory
to the assumptions. Second, we consider the unlinkability of our scheme, which means the
attacker is not able to learn whether two records have the same keyword w from their indexes
without the trapdoor Tw . This is achieved by introducing the identifier of records to build
the codeword. The same keyword in two records will have different codewords in two indexes.
We refer the reader to [33] for the mathematical proof.
In general, the main methodology of our scheme is increasing the space efficiency of the
SSE scheme with the permission of a few information leakages based on the characteristics
of CPS data. Our scheme was built based on the direct index structure, so it is dynamic
and easy-updating. We use the codeword array as the index of each record, which leads to
a small index size compared with schemes that involve the keyword dictionary. Since the
codewords are randomly inserted, the searching complexity of our scheme becomes O(2d · n).
However, since the number of desired keywords n is believed to be a very small constant in
practical application, the search algorithm will still be efficient. Our scheme is similar to the
PPSED scheme described in [17]. Both schemes used direct index structure and an array
as the index. However, since there are always new keywords (e.g. timestamps) generated in
CPS data, the index size of the PPSED scheme will become extremely large. Table 2.1 gives
a detailed comparison between our design and the widespread SSE schemes.
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2.4.3

Extension

It is obvious to see that updating the new record and associated index to the server is
straightforward. The client just needs to run the BuildIndex function of the new record to
obtain the index, and appends the (encrypted record, index) pair to the records and indexes
stored in the server.
The plain scheme considers the scenario that only one keyword is searched in a round. In
practice, the client may want to search for records that meet specific keyword requirements.
One simple example can be a government department that wants to query a dataset of utility
companies. A meaningful query can be (State: TN and Establish Year: 1998 or 1999). The
boolean operations on multiple keywords can be easily applied to the codewords matching
process when the server runs Search function.

2.5
2.5.1

Implementation
Example Smart Grid Data

The public dataset we used to test the effectiveness of our scheme is the statistical AMI data
provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) [4]. The AMI data are
derived from EIA-861M form, which stands for “Monthly Electric Power Industry Report.”
The report collects sales of electricity and revenue each month from a statistically chosen
sample of electric utilities in the United States. EIA started to collect monthly green pricing,
net metering, and advanced metering data since 2011. We choose the CSV file of advanced
metering data of the year 2016 as the dataset for our implementation.
As shown in Table 2.2, the CSV contains 31 columns, including year, month, utility
name, state, residential AMI, and so on. In our experiment, we select all features except
Year from Utility Characteristics and all features from AMI related categories as our desired
types of keywords. The CSV file contains 4819 records in total, and the data types include
string and unsigned integer.
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Table 2.1: Perfomance Comparison of Various SSE Schemes
scheme
Encryption index FP update Complexity
final scheme [94]
special
no
no
easy
O(2d · N )
Z-IDX [33]
general
direct
yes
easy
O(2d )
PPSED [17]
general
direct
no
easy
O(2d )
SSE-1 [22]
general
inverted no
hard
O(1)
our scheme
general
direct
no
easy
O(2d · n)
2d is the number of records, N is the keywords number in a record.
n is the number of desired keywords in a record, where 2d  n.
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Size
none
O(2d · n)
O((2d )2 )
O(2d · n)
O(2d · n)

2.5.2

Prototype

For simplicity, we use Python 2.7 as the programming language for the prototype. We
claim that a low-level language like C can be used in practice with the consideration of
speed. We build the encryption scheme with the help of Pycrypto [2], which is a widely used
cryptography library for python. Generally, the ciphers and hash functions in Pycrypto are
written in C and provide Python API. We use Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block
cipher with 128 bits key as the pseudo-random function and the MD5 as the hash function
described in our scheme. We note that MD5 has been severely compromised and is no longer
secure for integrity protection. However, the MD5 in our prototype is only used to generate
a unique identifier for record and keyword, similar to the building dictionary process in other
schemes.
Since the original ciphertext usually contains unprintable characters that will destroy
CSV format, we store the ciphertext as the hexadecimal string to maintain a clear CSV
format for demonstration. However, the hexadecimal string will lead to a larger index size.
Therefore, we suggest that an efficient file-index management system is needed for real-world
applications.
The source code is tested on a Mac OS X machine with a 1.6 GHz Intel Core i5 processor
and 8GB memory. Our experiment result shows that 4819 indexes can be searched in around
0.15 seconds. The source code of the prototype is available on Github [3].
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Table 2.2: Features of AMI Dataset from EIA
category
feature
Utility
Year, Month, Utility Number,
Characteristics
Utility Name, State, Data Status
Number AMR - Automated
Metering Reading
Number AMI - Advanced
Residential, Commercial,
Metering Infrastructure
Industrial, Transportation, Total
Non AMR/AMI Meters
Total Number of Meters
Energy Saved - AMI (MWh)
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Chapter 3
Customer Domain Adversarial
Attacks: Energy Theft Detection
In this chapter, we study the adversarial attack in DNN-based energy theft detection as an
example of the customer domain of cyber-physical systems.

3.1

Introduction

Energy theft causes high financial losses to electric utility companies around the world
[31]. In recent years, two-way data communications between the customers and utilities are
enabled by the development of the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). Smart meters
that provide fine-grained power consumption data of customers are expected to mitigate
energy theft. However, the smart meters are shown to be vulnerable to physical penetration
[9] and there are even video tutorials online on smart meter hacking [95]. To date, the energy
theft problem is still serious and the corresponding detection approaches are needed.
Currently, the energy theft detection approaches proposed in the literature can be
categorized into sensor-based and user profile-based detection. The sensor-based methods
requires extra equipment to be deployed in AMI while the user profile-based detection
exploits the abnormal variations in customer’s power usage patterns. In recent years, machine
learning (ML) techniques, especially deep learning (DL), are studied in the literature to
detect energy theft [118, 46, 116, 31, 78, 49, 85, 119, 42, 52]. The ML-based approaches
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take advantage of the massive fine-grained power consumption data of smart meters and can
achieve state-of-the-art performance. Meanwhile, they are usually pure software systems and
are compatible with the legacy power system infrastructures.
However, recent studies in the computer vision (CV) domain have shown that the welltrained DL models are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples [96, 35, 89, 77? ]. By adding
a well-crafted perturbation to the legitimate input, adversarial attackers can deceive the DL
models to output wrong prediction results. The same perturbation is transferable between
different DL models that own different structures and are trained with different datasets.
Adversarial attacks are also demonstrated to be effective in power system applications [19,
20, 59]. As DL becomes a popular technique in energy theft detection, the potential risks of
adversarial attacks need to be investigated, which is the focus of this paper.
Although sophisticated adversarial machine learning (AML) algorithms have been
proposed in the CV domain, they can not be applied for energy theft directly due to different
requirements for the examples. For instance, the adversarial perturbations in the CV domain
are required to be small so that the adversarial image will be hardly perceptible to human
eyes. Since such constraints do not apply to an energy thief, the performances of the AML
algorithms in energy theft need to be evaluated. To increase the stolen profit, the energy
thief should focus on the size of the adversarial example (power consumption measurements
reported to the utilities) instead of the perturbation. The adversarial attack that maximizes
the attacker’s profit should be formulated to evaluate the reliability of the DL detection
models.
In this chapter, we investigate the vulnerabilities of DL-based energy theft detection
through AML, including single-step attacks and iterative (multiple-step) attacks. We design
SearchFromFree, a framework to increase the attacker’s profit. The main contributions of
this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We study the vulnerabilities of DL-based energy theft detection and summarize the
properties of adversarial attacks in energy theft detection by proposing a general threat
model.
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• We propose a random adversarial measurement initialization approach to maximize the
attacker’s stolen profit. It is compatible with different state-of-the-art AML algorithms
and can generate valid adversarial examples with low energy costs. Meanwhile, we
design an iterative adversarial measurement generation algorithm that employs a stepsize search scheme to increase the performance of black-box attacks.
• The evaluations are implemented with three types of neural networks that are trained
with a real-world smart meter dataset. The result shows that our framework can
generate small adversarial measurements that can successfully bypass the detection.

3.2

Related Work

The support vector machine (SVM) was employed by Nagi et al. to detect abnormal
power usage behaviors based on the historian consumption data in 2009 [79]. Depuru et
al. extended their approach and included more features, such as the type of consumer and
geographic location [24]. Jokar et al. generated a synthetic attack dataset and trained
a multi-class SVM classifier for each customer to detect malicious power consumption [49].
SVM is also combined with other techniques, such as a fuzzy inference system [80] or decision
tree [48] to detect energy theft. In 2017, Zheng et al. employed deep convolutional neural
networks (CNN) to detect energy theft based on a real-world dataset and achieved a high
detection rate [119]. [78] trained a deep recurrent neural network (RNN) and randomly
searched for model parameters. In 2020, Ismail et al. studied energy theft in the distributed
generation domain and proposed a hybrid neural network detection model [46]. Other DLbased energy theft detection approaches can be found in [42, 52].
In 2013, Szegedy et al. proposed the adversarial attacks to deep neural networks in
the CV domain [96]. After that, various AML algorithms were proposed, such as the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) by Goodfellow et al. [35], Fast Gradient Value (FGV) by
Rozsa et al. [89], and DeepFool by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [77]. Recently, adversarial attacks
on power system ML applications are also investigated. Chen et al. showed that both the
classification and regression applications in the power system are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks [19]. They then launched adversarial attacks to study the vulnerabilities of load
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forecasting [20]. In 2019, Liu et al. showed that the DL-based AC state estimation can
be compromised by adversarial attacks [65]. [59] studied the DL-based false data injection
attack detection in DC state estimation and demonstrated that the attacker can compromise
both the DL detection and residual-based detection with physical constraints. Marulli et
al. studied the data poisoning attacks to ML models in energy theft detection using the
generative adversarial network (GAN) [71] but they did not consider the evasion attacks and
the attacker’s profit.

3.3
3.3.1

Formation and Design
Adversarial Energy Theft Formation

To launch energy theft, the attacker is assumed to be able to compromise his/her smart meter
and freely modify the power consumption measurements that are reported to the utilities.
In general, the DL-based energy theft detection in AMI can be considered as a binary
classification problem. Given the power consumption measurements M , the utility company
utilizes a DL classifier fθ : M → Y trained by a dataset {M, Y } to map the measurements M
to their labels Y (Normal or Theft). The adversarial attack in energy theft detection should
be a false-negative attack that deceives the DL classifier fθ to categorize the adversarial
measurement vectors A as normal. Meanwhile, A needs to be small so that the energy thief
can obtain a high profit. Without loss of generality, the adversarial attack in energy theft
can be represented as an optimization problem:

min kak1

(3.1a)

s.t. fθ (a) → N ormal

(3.1b)

ai ≥ 0
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(3.1c)

where a represents an adversarial measurement vector, kak1 =

P

kai k is the L1 -Norm of

a. The constraint (3.1c) requires that all the power consumption measurement ai in a must
be non-negative to be feasible.

3.3.2

Threat Model

We propose a practical threat model for the adversarial attacks in energy theft detection, as
described below:
• The attacker can freely modify the meter’s power consumption measurements reported
to the utilities. In practice, this can be implemented through physical penetration to
the smart meter.
• If a DL model was trained by the utilities, it will usually be deployed on a separate
server that owns isolated access networks. We consider a black-box adversarial attack
that the energy thief cannot access to the utilities’ DL model fθ and training dataset
{M, Y }.
• The attacker can obtain an alternative dataset {M 0 , Y 0 }, such as a historian or public
dataset, to train his/her model fθ0 0 to generate adversarial measurements. The principle
behinds the black-box attack is the transferability of adversarial examples.
• The attacker needs to generate non-negative adversarial measurements to be practical,
as shown in 3.1c.
In section 3.4, we will also evaluate the performance of white-box attacks that allow the
attacker to fully access the DL model fθ , such as insider attackers. Such evaluations can
study the reliability of the detection system under the worst-case scenario and the upper
bound performance of the adversarial attacks.

3.3.3

State-of-the-art Approaches

Since the constraint (3.1b) defined by the neural network is highly-nonlinear, formation (3.1)
is difficult to solve directly by existing optimization approaches. Generally, the existing AML
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algorithms maximize the adversarial attack performance by increasing the prediction loss of
the DL model through gradient-based optimization. We release the related constraints, such
as the box-constraint, in the CV applications to fit the energy theft attack requirements.
In general, the AML algorithms can be categorized into single-step attacks and iterative
(multiple-step) attacks.

The single-step attacks usually have better transferability but

are relatively easy to defend, while the iterative attacks are more powerful but are less
transferable [54]. In this paper, we study three state-of-the-art AML algorithms, FGSM
[35], FGV [89] and DeepFool [77], as shown below:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
The FGSM method proposed in [35] is a single-step attack method. Given a, FGSM updates
the vector according to equation (3.2), where  is a constant, L is a loss function, and Ya is
the label (theft) of a. With the sign function, the perturbation vector size is controlled by
.

a = a +  · sign(∇a L(fθ (a), Ya ))

(3.2)

Fast Gradient Value (FGV)
The FGV method proposed in [89] is also a single-step algorithm and is similar to FGSM.
However, FGV employs the original gradient values instead of the sign value, as shown in
equation (3.3).

a = a +  · ∇a L(fθ (a), Ya )

(3.3)

DeepFool
The DeepFool algorithm proposed in [77] is an iterative algorithm that aims to minimize the
perturbation size. Assuming the neural networks utilize Softmax as the activation function
in the last layer, DeepFool keeps executing equation (3.4) until a can be classified as Normal
by fθ .
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a=a−

3.3.4

fθ (a)
∇a fθ (a)
k∇a fθ (a)k22

(3.4)

SearchFromFree Framework

Random Initialization
The state-of-the-art AML algorithms are originally designed for CV applications where the
main constraint is the magnitude of the adversarial perturbation. However, as demonstrated
in equation (3.1), the purpose of the attacker is to minimize the adversarial power
consumption measurements reported to the utility to reduce his/her cost.
Different from CV applications where the input images are given and static, the energy
thief can freely modify the smart meter’s measurements. Since the AML algorithms can
constrain the adversarial perturbation to be small, it is intuitive that the crafted adversarial
measurements will be small if the initial measurements for the DL model are small. In
practice, the minimum power consumption should be zero, which indicates a free electricity
bill to the energy thief. However, a constant zero measurement vector will result in constant
adversarial measurements, which is obviously abnormal to the utilities. We propose a scheme
that randomly initializes adversarial measurements according to a Gaussian distribution
a ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) with the mean value set to zero (µ = 0) and the standard deviation σ set to a
small value. We set all the non-negative values in a to zero to meet constraint (3.1c). This
initialization approach is compatible with different AML algorithms.
Step-size Searching Scheme
The iterative attacks usually have worse transferability. For example, the multiple-step
DeepFool attack executes an iteration process and return the adversarial example as soon as it
is misclassified by the given model. Empirically, the example is unique to the given model and
may have low transferability. In energy theft detection, the adversarial measurements from
the attacker are always smaller than normal measurements. Statistically, for a trained model,
larger adversarial measurement vectors will have a higher probability to bypass the detection.
Since the attacker’s model fθ0 may share a similar manifold with fθ , we design a step-size
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iterative scheme to search adversarial measurements that share the best transferability to
increase the performance of black-box iterative attacks.
Enabled by the random initialization approach, our step-size scheme can be represented
by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: SearchFromFree Iteration Algorithm
0
1 Input: fθ0 , step, size, σ
2 Output: a
0
3 function ssf-Iter(fθ0 , step, size, σ)
4
initialize a ∼ N (0, σ 2 )
5
a = clip(a, min=0)
6
initialize stepN um = 0
7
while stepN um ≤ step − 1 do
8
calculate gradient G = ∇a L(fθ0 0 (a), Ya )
9
r = G · size/max(abs(G))
10
update a = a + r
11
a = clip(a, min=0)
12
stepN um + +
13
end
14
return a
15 end

The ssf-Iter function in Algorithm 1 has four inputs, including the local ML model fθ0 0
and three positive constant parameters. The constant step limits the maximum number of
iteration while size defines the maximum modification of a in each iteration. As shown by
Line 4, we empirically initialize a according to a Gaussian distribution with the standard
deviation value equals to σ and mean value equals to zero. The iteration process gradually
increases kak1 to have a higher probability to bypass the detection. Therefore, a small initial
a will finally lead to a smaller kak1 and the attacker can make more profit. The perturbation
r generated from the loss gradient may cause negative measurement values in a. We set all
the negative values to zero to generate a feasible adversarial measurement vector a, as shown
by Line 5 and 11.
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3.4
3.4.1

Simulation Evaluation
Dataset Structure

We employ the smart meter data published by the Irish Social Science Data Archive (ISSDA)
[6] as it is widely used as a benchmark for energy theft detection in related literature [118, 116,
78, 49, 85, 52]. The dataset contains the smart meter energy consumption measurement data
of over 5000 customers in the Irish during 2009 and 2010. We assume all the measurement
data in the dataset is normal since the customers agreed to install the smart meters and
participated in the research project. There are missing and illegal measurements in the raw
dataset and we pre-process the dataset by filtering out the incomplete measurements. We
regulate the time-series measurement data into daily reading vectors and obtain the dataset
Ddaily . Since the power consumption measurements are recorded every 30 minutes, each
daily reading measurement vector will contain 48 power consumption measurements.
To solve the shortage of real-world energy theft datasets, we employ the false measurement data generation approach proposed in [116] to simulate the energy theft measurements,
which is a benchmark method used in previous literature [118, 31, 78, 49, 85]. [116] presents
six energy theft scenarios, as shown in Table 3.1. The attack h1 multiples the original
reading with a constant while h2 with a random constant vector generated from a uniform
distribution. The h3 considers that the energy thief reports zero consumption during a
specific period. The h4 scenario happens when an attacker constantly reports the mean
consumption. h5 is similar to h2 but multiplying the random constant vector with the mean
value instead of the real measurements. Finally, h6 reverses the records of a day so that the
small consumption will be reported during the periods in which the electricity price is lower.
A synthetic dataset is generated based Ddaily . We randomly sample 180,000 daily records
from Ddaily and modify half records in the sampled dataset according to the attack scenarios
described in Table 3.1. We label all normal records as 0 and polluted records as 1 with Onehot encoding. We finally obtain the defender dataset Ddef ender : {M180,000×48 , Y180,000×1 }. We
simulate the dataset Dattacker for the attacker in the same way.
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Table 3.1: Energy Theft Attack Scenarios [116]

Attack Scenario
h1 (mt ) = αmt , α ∼ U nif orm(0.1, 0.8)
h2 (mt ) = βt mt , 
βt ∼ U nif orm(0.1, 0.8)
0 ∀t ∈ [ti , tf ]
h3 (mt ) =
mt ∀t ∈
/ [ti , tf ]
h4 (mt ) = E(m)
h5 (mt ) = βt E(m)
h6 (mt ) = m48−t

31

3.4.2

Model Training

The evaluation experiments are conducted based on three types of deep neural networks
(DNN), feed-forward neural network (FNN), CNN, and RNN. We train three DL models for
the defender (utilities) and three separate models for the attacker with Ddef ender and Dattacker
respectively. For each model, 20% records in Ddef ender or Dattacker are randomly sampled for
testing the rest 80% for training. We manually tuned the parameters of the model training
and the performances of corresponding models are shown in Table 3.2. Overall, the RNNs
achieve the best classification performance since they have an intrinsic advantage in learning
the pattern of time-series data. The structures of the neural networks are shown in Table
3.3. All the DNNs are implemented with the TensorFlow and Keras library. The training
process is conducted on a Windows 10 PC with an Intel Core i7 CPU, 16 GB memory, and
an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1070 graphic card to accelerate the training process. The models
are optimized with a Rmsprop optimizer.

3.4.3

Metrics and Baselines

Metrics
We set two metrics to evaluate the performance of adversarial attacks. Since all the test
records are false measurements (generated by our random initialization scheme), the first
metric is the detection recall (TP/(TP + FN)) of the defender’s models under adversarial
attacks.
We set two metrics to evaluate the performance of adversarial attacks. Since all the test
records are false measurements (generated by our random initialization scheme), the first
metric is the detection recall (TP/(TP + FN)) of the defender’s models under adversarial
attacks. Meanwhile, it is straightforward that a larger adversarial measurement vector will
have a higher probability to bypass the detection. Therefore, we set the average L1 -Norm
of the adversarial measurement vectors as the second evaluation metric. In our experiment,
the average L1 -Norm of all normal measurement records is 32.05 kWh.
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Table 3.2: Model Performance

Model

Accuracy

False Positive Rate

fF N N
fF0 N N
fRN N
0
fRN
N
fCN N
0
fCN
N

86.9%
86.87%
97.5%
97.48%
93.49%
93.28%

10.01%
14.01%
2.58%
2.62%
7.79%
6.41%

Table 3.3: Model Structures

Networks
Models
Layer 0
Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer 3
Layer 4
Layer 5
Layer 6
Layer 7
Layer 8

FNN

RNN

CNN

0
0
fF N N
fF0 N N
fRN N
fRN
fCN N
fCN
N
N
input 48
input 48
input 48 × 1
input 48 × 1
input 6 × 8
input 6 × 8
128 Dense
168 Dense
256 LSTM
246 LSTM
128 Conv2D
156 Conv2D
256 Dense
328 Dense
Dropout 0.25
Dropout 0.25
128 Conv2D
214 Conv2D
128 Dense
168 Dense
168 LSTM
148 LSTM
MaxPooling2D
MaxPooling2D
Dropout 0.25
128 Dense
Dropout 0.25
Dropout 0.25
Dropput 0.25
Dropput 0.25
32 Dense
Dropout 0.25
128 LSTM
108 LSTM
flatten
flatten
Dropout 0.25
64 Dense
2 Dense Softmax 2 Dense Softmax
32 Dense
48 Dense
2 Dense Softmax
Dropout 0.25
Dense 2 Softmax Dense 2 Softmax
2 Dense Softmax
-

The models f∗ act as the defenders while f∗0 as attackers. The activation function of each layer is ReLu
unless specifically noted. The kernel size is 3 × 3 for CNN models.
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Baselines
We set up two vanilla black-box attackers as baselines to demonstrate the effectiveness
of adversarial attacks. The first vanilla attacker VA1 will gradually try different α of h1 as
defined in Table 3.1 while the second vanilla attacker VA2 generates uniformly distributed
measurement vector between 0 and a variable u.

3.4.4

Experimental Result

The evaluation experiments are conducted with 1,000 adversarial measurement vectors. All
the DNN’s detection recall of the original randomly initialized adversarial measurement
vectors is 100%. The standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution used for initialization
is set to σ = 0.0001.
Vanilla Attacks
As expected, the detection recall of the defenders’ models decreases with the parameter α
increases under VA1 attack. This indicates that VA1 has a higher success probability if
he/she was willing to decrease his/her stolen profit. From Fig. 3.1, if VA1 wants to have
a relatively high success probability for energy theft, such as over 65%, the required power
consumption bill should be over 20 kWh (α > 0.65).
As shown in Fig. 3.2, the detection recall of RNN and CNN remains high (over 95%)
with the parameter u increases. This indicates that a uniformly distributed consumption
measurement vector is obviously abnormal for models that are trained to learn the daily
electricity consumption patterns. Overall, the VA2 attack is not effective for energy theft.
State-of-the-art Approaches
We apply the random initialization approach to the state-of-the-art AML algorithms and
evaluate the attack performances under the white-box and black-box settings. Similar to
Algorithm 1, we map all the negative values in the adversarial measurements to zero to be
feasible. We test different  values for FGSM and FGV, and evaluation result is shown in
Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4 respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Vanilla attacker 1 evaluation result.
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Figure 3.2: Vanilla attacker 2 evaluation result.
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Figure 3.3: FGSM Evaluation Result
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Figure 3.4: FGV Evaluation Result
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From Fig. 3.3, we can learn that FGSM can achieve notable attack performance for FNN
and RNN. In the black-box settings, the probability of bypassing RNN detection is over
90% while the adversarial measurement’s L1 -Norm is only 2.9 kWh ( = 10−0.9 ). The attack
performance is even better for FNN. When  = 10−1.2 , the energy thief obtains a 100%
detection bypassing rate with a 1.4 kWh electricity bill. The single-step attack FGSM does
not perform well for CNN detection. The best evasion rate is around 44% for the white-box
attack and 32% for the black-box attack.
Overall, the attack performance of FGV is slightly worse than FGSM in black-box settings
but is still effective, as shown in Fig. 3.4. For example, the black-box attack to RNN obtains
a 94% detection bypassing rate while the L1 -Norm is 10.6 kWh ( = 10−0.5 ), which is higher
than FGSM (2.9 kWh) but is still smaller than the normal measurements (32.05 kWh).
Similar to FGSM, the FGV achieves the best performance for FNN detection, followed by
RNN and CNN.
The evaluation result of the iterative attack DeepFool is summarized in Table 3.4. The
iterative attack demonstrates notable performances in white-box settings. The detection
recall of all three DNNs becomes 0% under white-box attacks while the L1 -Norm is smaller
than 1 kWh. However, as expected, the adversarial measurements generated by iterative
attacks are less transferable. Under the black-box setting, the DeepFool attack only shows
effectiveness in FNN detection while the detection recall of CNN and RNN remains 100%.
SearchFromFree Iteration Algorithm
We then evaluate the performance of our ssf-Iter algorithm, an iterative attack algorithm
that utilizes a step-size scheme to search for transferable adversarial measurements, as shown
in Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6.
From Fig. 3.5, we can learn that our algorithm performs best in FNN, followed by CNN
and RNN. In most cases, the detection recall of three DNNs approaches to zero under the
white-box attack while the adversarial measurements are still small enough (around 1 kWh).
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Table 3.4: DeepFool Evaluation Performance

Model
Metric
white-box
black-box

FNN
CNN
RNN
recall size recall size recall
size
0%
0.94 0%
0.23
0%
0.02
17.4% 1.14 100% 0.115 100%
0.06

∗ ‘size’ is the L1 -Norm of adversarial measurements (kWh)
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Figure 3.5: White-box SearchFromFree
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Figure 3.6: Black-box SearchFromFree.
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As expected, the adversarial performances under the black-box setting are worse than the
white-box setting, as shown in Fig. 3.6. In general, the probability of bypassing the detection
is lower and the corresponding measurement size is larger. The attacker is required to pay a
higher cost (L1 -Norm of adversarial measurements) in the black-box settings to obtain the
same detection bypassing rate in the white-box settings. Statistically, the FNN detection
still performs worst under black-box adversarial attacks. By analyzing the corresponding
evaluation parameters, we can learn that the attacker can bypass the FNN’s detection with
nearly 100% success probability while the average L1 -Norm is around 1 kWh. For CNN
detection, our adversarial attack can achieve over 70% successful rate while keeping the
L1 -Norm below 4 kWh.
Attack performance is better for RNN detection. In most attack scenarios, the RNN’s
detection recall is below 30% while the L1 -Norm is lower than 3 kWh. It is worth noting
that if the attacker sets size to 0.01, the adversarial attack can obtain over 80% successful
probability with an around 0.2 kWh measurement size. Compared with the DeepFool
attack, our algorithm achieves similar performance in the white-box settings and better
transferability under the black-box settings.
Parameter Selection:

Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6 show that the attack performances can

be impacted by the parameters in Algorithm 1. However, from the 2D pixel figures, we
can observe that the attack performances follow specific patterns according to the two
parameters. Overall, as long as the parameters fall in a specific range, the attack performance
will be satisfied. Meanwhile, by comparing Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6, we can learn that the
performances of black-box attacks share similar manifolds with white-box attacks under
our step-size scheme. This indicates that the attacker can select the algorithm parameters
based on the performances of his/her local DL models. In practical scenarios, different
attackers may also collude together to search for the parameters that produce the best
attack performance.
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Chapter 4
Control Domain Adversarial Attacks
in CPS: ConAML
In this section, we study the adversarial attacks in control domain CPSs by proposing the
ConAML framework.

4.1

Introduction

Machine learning (ML) has shown promising performance in many real-world applications,
such as image classification [43], speech recognition [36], and malware detection [114]. In
recent years, motivated by the promotion of cutting-edge communication and computational
technologies, there is a trend to adopt ML in various control domain cyber-physical system
(CPS) applications, such as data center thermal management [61], agriculture ecosystem
management [23], power grid attack detection [83], and industrial control system anomaly
detection [53].
However, recent research has demonstrated that the superficially well-trained ML models
are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples [96, 35, 89, 75, 55, 25, 76]. In particular,
adversarial machine learning (AML) technologies enable attackers to deceive ML models
with well-crafted adversarial examples by adding small perturbations to legitimate inputs.
As CPSs have become synonymous to security-critical infrastructures such as the power grid,
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nuclear systems, avionics, and transportation systems, such vulnerabilities can be exploited
leading to devastating consequences.
AML research has received considerable attention in artificial intelligence (AI) communities and it mainly focuses on computational applications such as computer vision. However, it
is not applicable to control domain CPSs because the inherent properties of CPSs render the
widely-used threat models and AML algorithms in previous research infeasible. In general,
the existing AML research makes common assumptions on the attacker’s knowledge and the
adversarial examples. The attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of the ML inputs and
these features are assumed to be mutually independent. For example, in computer vision
AML [35], the attacker is assumed to know all the values of pixels of an image and there is
no strict dependency among the pixels. However, this is not realistic for attacks targeting
control domain CPSs. CPSs are usually large and complex systems whose data sources
are heterogeneous and geographically distributed. The attacker may compromise a subset
of sensors and modify their measurement data. Generally, for the uncompromised data
sources, the attacker cannot even know the measurements, let alone making modifications.
Furthermore, for robustness and resilience reasons, control domain CPSs usually employ
redundant data sources and incorporate faulty data detection mechanisms. For example, in
the power grid, redundant phasor measurement units (PMUs) are deployed in the field to
measure frequency and phase angle, and residue-based bad data detection is employed to
detect and recover from faulty data for state estimation [106]. Therefore, the features of ML
applications in CPS are not only dependent but also subject to the physical constraints of
the system. A simple example of constraints is shown in Figure 4.1. All three meters are
measuring the electric current (Ampere) data. If an attacker compromises Meter1, Meter2,
and Meter3, no matter what modification the attacker makes to the measurements, the
compromised measurement of Meter1 should always be the sum of that of Meter2 and
Meter3 due to Kirchhoff’s laws. Otherwise, the crafted measurements will be detected by
the bad data detection mechanism and obviously anomalous to the power system operators.
In addition to distributed data sources and physical constraints, sensors in real-world CPSs
are generally configured to collect data with a specific sampling rate. A valid adversarial
attack needs to be finished within the CPS’ sampling period.
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Figure 4.1: A CPS example (power grids).
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The intrinsic properties of CPS pose stringent requirements for the attackers. The
attacker is now required to overcome:
• Model constraint: No access to the original CPS DNNs.
• Sensor constraint:

Can only compromise a portion of sensors and modify their

values.
• Knowledge constraint: No access to the ML models and the measurement values
of uncompromised sensors.
• Physical constraint: The adversarial examples need to meet the physical constraints
defined by the system.
• Time constraint:

Attacks needs to be completed within a sample period of the

sensors.
to launch an effective attack that deceives the ML applications deployed in CPSs.
However, in this chapter, we show that the ML applications in CPSs are susceptible to
handcrafted adversarial examples even though such systems naturally pose a greater barrier
for the attacker.
In this chapter, we propose constrained adversarial machine learning (ConAML), a
general AML framework that incorporates the above constraints of CPSs. We firstly design
a universal adversarial measurement algorithm to solve the knowledge constraint. After that,
without loss of generality, we present a practical best-effort search algorithm to effectively
generate adversarial examples under linear physical constraints which are one of the most
common constraints in real-world CPS applications.

Meanwhile, we set the maximum

iteration number to control the time cost of the attack. We implement our algorithms
with ML models used in three CPS applications and mainly focus on neural networks due
to its transferability. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We highlight the potential vulnerability of deploying ML in CPSs, analyze the different
requirements for AML applied in CPSs with regard to the general computational
applications, and present a practical threat model for AML in CPSs.
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• We formulate the mathematical model of ConAML by incorporating the physical
constraints of the underlying system. To the best of our knowledge, this is also the
first work that investigates the physical mutual dependency among the ML features in
AML research.
• We proposed ConAML, an AML framework that contains a series of AML algorithms
to generate adversarial examples under the corresponding constraints.
• We assess our algorithms with three typical CPS applications, including incident
detection in transportation system, FDIA detection in the power grids and anomaly
detection water treatment system, where ML are intensively investigated for attack
detection in the research literature [40, 62, 115, 87, 86, 120, 83, 111, 44, 47, 10, 81,
105, 45, 53, 28, 18, 27, 5]. The evaluation results show that the adversarial examples
generated by our algorithms can effectively bypass the ML-powered detection systems
in the three CPSs.

4.2

Related Work

AML of neural networks was discovered by Szegedy et al. [96] in 2013. They found that a
deep neural network used for image classification can be easily fooled by adding a certain,
hardly perceptible perturbation to the legitimate input. Moreover, the same perturbation can
cause a different network to misclassify the same input even when the network has a different
structure and is trained with a different dataset, which is referred to as the transferability
property of adversarial examples in the following research. After that, in 2015, Goodfellow
et al. [35] proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), an efficient algorithm to
generate adversarial examples. The Fast Gradient Value (FGV) method proposed by Rozsa
et al. [89] is a simple variant of FGSM, in which the authors utilize the raw gradient
instead of the sign. In 2016, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. presented DeepFool which searches for
the closest distance between the original input to the decision boundary in high dimensional
data space and iteratively builds the adversarial examples [75]. According to [55], single-step
attack methods have better transferability but can be easily defended. Therefore, multi-steps
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methods, such as iterative methods [55] and momentum-based methods [25], are presented
to enhance the effectiveness of attacks. The above methods generate individual adversarial
examples for each legitimate inputs. In 2017, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. designed universal
adversarial perturbations to generate perturbations regardless of the ML model inputs [76].
Research on AML applications continues growing rapidly.

Sharif et al.

generated

adversarial examples to attack a state-of-the-art face-recognition system and achieved a
notable result [92]. Grossee et al. constructed an effective attack that generated adversarial
examples against Android malware detection models [37]. The adversarial attacks that
target real-world applications also increase. In 2014, Laskov et al. developed a taxonomy
for practical adversarial attacks based on the attackers’ capability and launched evasion
attacks to PDFRATE, a real-world online machine learning system to detect malicious PDF
malware [88]. Followed by Xu et al. , in 2016, they utilized a genetic programming algorithm
to generate evasion adversarial examples to evaluate the robustness of ML classifiers [110].
Their methods were evaluated with PDFRATE and Hidost, another PDF malware classifier.
In 2018, Li et al. presented TEXTBUGGER, a framework to effectively generate adversarial
text against deep learning-based text understanding (DLTU) systems and achieved state-ofthe-art attack performance [58].
In addition to pure computation and cyberspace attacks, AML techniques that involve
the physical domain are drawing more and more attention. Kurakin et al. presented that ML
models are still vulnerable to adversarial examples in physical world scenarios by feeding a
phone camera captured adversarial image to an ImageNet classifier [54]. In 2016, Carlini et al.
presented hidden voice commands and demonstrated that well-crafted voice commands which
are unintelligible to human listeners, can be interpreted as commands by voice controllable
systems [15]. [99] and [67] investigated the security of machine learning models used in
autonomous driving cars. In 2018, [32] showed that an attacker can generate adversarial
examples by modifying a portion of measurements in CPSs, and presented an anomaly
detection model where each sensor’s reading is predicted as a function of other sensors’
readings. After that, Erba et al. also studied the AML in CPS and consider the physical
constraints [26]. They employed an autoencoder that trained on normal system data to
reconstruct the bad inputs to match the physical behavior. However, both [32] and [26]
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allow the attacker to know all the measurements and the generated adversarial examples
may still violate the physical constraints.
More related work on adversarial examples, including the generation algorithms and
related applications, can be found in [113].

4.3

System and Threat Model

4.3.1

ML-Assisted CPSs

Generally, a CPS can be simplified as a system that consists of four parts, namely sensors,
actuators, the communication network, and the control center [18], as shown in Figure 4.2.
The sensors measure and quantify the data from the physical environment, and send the
measurement data to the control center through the communication network. In practice,
the raw measurement data will be filtered and processed by the gateway according to the
error checking mechanism whose rules are defined by human experts based on the properties
of the physical system. Measurement data that violates the physically defined rules will be
removed.
Similar to [26], we consider the scenario that the control center utilizes ML model(s)
to make decisions (classification) based on the filtered measurement data from the gateway
directly, and the features used to train the ML models are the measurements of sensors
respectively. The target of the attacker will be deceiving the ML model(s) in CPSs to output
wrong (classification) results without being detected by the gateway by adding perturbations
to the measurements of the compromised sensors.

4.3.2

Threat Model

Adversarial attacks can be classified according to the attacker’s capability and attack goals
[88, 113, 16]. In this work, we consider the integrity attack that the attacker generates
adversarial perturbations to the ML inputs to deceive the ML model to make incorrect
classification outputs.
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Figure 4.2: Machine learning-assisted CPS architecture.

46

There are several inherent properties of CPS that pose specific requirements for
adversarial attacks. First, in CPS, ML models are usually placed in the control centers and
other centralized locations which employ comprehensive and advanced security measures such
as air-gapped networks. It is highly unlikely for the attacker to have access to the models
and a black-box attack should be considered. Second, we assume that the attacker cannot
access the training dataset for the same reason as above, but has access to an alternative
dataset such as historical data that follows a similar distribution to train their models. It is
possible for the attacker to obtain historical data in practice, for instance, temperature data
for load forecasting, earthquake sensor data, flood water flow data, and traffic flow data,
since these data are usually published or shared among multiple parties.
To launch adversarial attacks, the attacker is assumed to compromise a certain number
of sensors, and can freely eavesdrop and modify their measurement data. These sensors are
deployed in the wild and their security is hard to guarantee. In real attack scenarios, this
can be implemented by either directly compromising the sensors, such as device intrusion
or attacking the communication network, such as man-in-the-middle attacks. However, due
to the vastly distributed nature of sensors in CPS, it is only reasonable for the attacker
to compromise a subset of the data sources but not all of them. For the uncompromised
sensors, the attacker can neither know their measurement values nor make modifications.
This constraint indicates that the attacker has limited knowledge of the ML inputs.
Meanwhile, the attacker is further required to generate adversarial examples that meet
the constraints imposed by the physical laws and system topology and evade any built-in
detection mechanisms in the system. Specifically, since they are very common in real-world
CPSs, we will mainly focus on linear constraints in this work, including both linear equality
constraints and linear inequality constraints. An example of the linear inequality constraint
is shown in Figure 4.3. All the meters in Figure 4.3 are measuring water flow which follows
the arrows’ direction. If an attacker wants to defraud the anomaly detection ML model of
a water treatment system by modifying the meters’ readings, the adversarial measurement
of Meter1 should always be larger than the sum of Meter2 and Meter3 due to the physical
structure of the pipelines. Otherwise, the poisoned inputs will be obviously anomalous to
the victim (system operator) and detected automatically by the error checking mechanisms.
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Figure 4.3: A CPS example (water pipelines).
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In practice, many of the linear constraints can be explicitly abstracted by the attacker
from the compromised measurement data. Meanwhile, the practical CPSs usually have builtin tolerance for noise and normal fluctuation in the measurements so that the approximately
estimated constraints will still be effective for the adversarial attackers. Therefore, we assume
that the attacker know the linear constraints among the compromised measurements.
The real-world CPSs, such as the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA),
will have a constant measurement sampling rate (frequency) configured for their sensors. The
attacker who targets CPSs’ ML applications is then required to generate a valid adversarial
example within a measurement sampling period.
We summarize the threat model as follows:
• We assume the attacker has no access to the system operator’s trained model in the
control center, including the hyper-parameters and the related dataset. However, the
attacker has an alternative dataset as an approximation of the defender’s (system
operator’s) training dataset to train his/her ML models.
• The attacker can compromise a subset of sensors in the CPS and make modifications
to their measurement data. However, the attack can neither know nor modify the
measurements of uncompromised sensors.
• The attacker can know the linear constraints of the measurements imposed by the
physical system.

4.3.3

Physical Constraint Mathematical Representation

In this subsection, we present the mathematical definition of the physical linear constraints
of the ML inputs and represent the AML as a constrained optimization problem.
Notations


To simplify the mathematical representation, we will use AB = ab0 , ab1 , ..., abn−1 to denote a
sampled vector of A = [a0 , a1 , ..., am−1 ] according to B, where B = [b0 , b1 , ..., bn−1 ] is a vector
of sampling index. For example, if A = [a, b, c, d, e] and B = [0, 2, 4], we have AB = [a, c, e].
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We assume there are totally d sensors in a CPS, and each sensor’s measurement is
a feature of the ML model fθ in the control center. We use S = [s0 , s1 , ..., sd−1 ]T and
M = [m0 , m1 , ..., md−1 ]T to denote all the sensors and their measurements respectively. The
attacker compromised r sensors in the CPS and C = [c0 , c1 , ..., cr−1 ] denotes the index vector
of the compromised sensors. Obviously, we have kCk = r and 0 < r ≤ d. Meanwhile, the
uncompromised sensors’ indexes are denoted as U = [u0 , u1 , ..., ud−r−1 ] (kU k = d − r).
∆ = [δ0 , δ1 , ..., δd−1 ]T is the adversarial perturbation to be added to M . However, the

T
attacker can only inject ∆C = δc0 , δc1 , ..., δcr−1
to MC while ∆U = 0. The polluted
adversarial measurements become MC∗ = MC + ∆C , and m∗ci = mci + δci (0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1).
Apparently, we have δi = δcj when i = cj , i ∈ C, and δi = 0 when i ∈
/ C. Similarly, the


crafted adversarial example M ∗ = m∗0 , m∗1 , ..., m∗d−1 = M + ∆ is fed into fθ . We have
/ C. All the notations are summarized
m∗i = m∗cj when i = cj , i ∈ C and m∗i = mi when i ∈
in Table 4.1.
Mathematical Presentation
For linear equality constraints, such as the current measurements (Amperes) of the three
meters in Figure 4.1, we suppose there are k constraints of the compromised measurements
MC that the attacker needs to meet, and the k constraints can be represented as follow:



φ0,0 · mc0 + ... + φ0,r−1 · mcr−1 = φ0,r




 φ · m + ... + φ
1,0
c0
1,r−1 · mcr−1 = φ1,r


...




 φ
k−1,0 · mc0 + ... + φk−1,r−1 · mcr−1 = φk−1,r

(4.1)

The above constraints can be represented as (4.2). We have Φk×r = [Φ0 , Φ1 , ..., Φk−1 ]T ,
where Φi = [φi,0 , φi,1 , ..., φi,r−1 ] (0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1), Φi,j = φi,j (0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1) and
Φ̃ = [φ0,r , φ1,r , ..., φk−1,r ]T .

Φk×r MC = Φ̃
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(4.2)

Table 4.1: List of Notations
Symbol
fθ
S
M
∆
M∗
C
U
Y
Y0
Φ

Description
The trained model with hyperparameter θ
The vector of sensors
The vector of measurements of S
The perturbations vector added to M
The sum of ∆ and M . The vector of
compromised input
The vector of the indexes of compromised
sensors or measurements
The vector of the indexes of uncompromised
sensors or measurements
The original class of the measurement M
The target class of the measurement M ∗
The linear constraint matrix
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The attacker generates the perturbation vector ∆C and adds it to MC such that fθ will
predict the different output. Meanwhile, the crafted measurements MC∗ = ∆C + MC should
also meet the constraints in (4.2) to avoid being noticed by the system operator or detected
by the error checking mechanism.
Formally, the attacker who launches AML attacks needs to solve the following optimization problem:

max L(fθ (M ∗ ), Y )
∆C

s.t. MC∗ = MC + ∆C

(4.3a)
(4.3b)

Φk×r MC = Φ̃

(4.3c)

Φk×r MC∗ = Φ̃

(4.3d)

M∗ = M + ∆

(4.3e)

∆U = 0

(4.3f)

where L is a loss function, and Y is the original class label of the input vector M .
In addition, the linear inequality constraints among the compromised measurements
can be represented as equation (4.4), and the constrained optimization problem to be solved
is also similar to (4.3) but replacing (4.3c) with Φk×r MC ≤ Φ̃ and (4.3d) with Φk×r MC∗ ≤ Φ̃
respectively.

Φk×r MC ≤ Φ̃

4.4

(4.4)

Design of ConAML

The universal adversarial measurements algorithm is proposed in subsection 4.4.1 to solve
the knowledge constraint of the attacker. Subsection 4.4.2 and subsection 4.4.4 analyze the
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properties of physical linear equality constraints and linear inequality constraints in AML
respectively and present the adversarial algorithms.

4.4.1

Universal Adversarial Measurements

Algorithm 2: Universal Adv-Measur Algorithm
1 Input: fθ , M U , MC , λ, Y , M axItera
∗
2 Output: M
3 function uniAdvMeasur(fθ , M U, MC , λ, Y, M axItera)
4
initialize ∆ = 0 
5
build set M U C = MC|U0 , MC|U1 , ..., MC|UN
6
set counter cycN um = 0
7
while cycN um < M axItera do
8
set f lag to 0
9
for MC|Ui in M U C do
10
∆ = onePerturGenAlgorithm(∆, MC|Ui )
11
if sampleEva(fθ , Y, M U C, ∆) < λ then
12
set f lag to 1
13
break
14
end
15
end
16
if f lag equals 1 then
17
break
18
end
19
cycN um++
20
end
21
return M ∗ = M + ∆
22 end

We first deal with the challenge of the attacker’s limited knowledge on the uncompromised
measurements MU . This challenge is difficult to tackle since the complete measurement
vector M is needed to obtain the gradient values in many AML algorithms [35, 89, 75, 55, 76]
. In 2017, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. proposed the universal adversarial perturbation scheme
which generates image-agnostic adversarial perturbation vectors [76]. The identical universal
adversarial perturbation vector can cause different images to be misclassified by the state-ofthe-art ML-based image classifiers with high probability. The basic philosophy of [76] is to
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iteratively and incrementally build a perturbation vector that can misclassify a set of images
sampled from the whole dataset.
Algorithm 3: Sample Evaluation
1 Input: fθ , Y , M U C, ∆
2 Output: Classification Accuracy
3 function sampleEva(fθ , Y, M U C, ∆)
4
add perturbation ∆ to all vectors in M U C
5
evaluate M U C with fθ and label Y
6
return the classification accuracy of fθ (M U C)
7 end

Inspired by their approach, we now present our universal adversarial measurements
algorithm. We define an ordered set of N sampled uncompromised measurements M U =

MU0 , MU1 , ..., MUN −1 , and use MC|Ui to denote the crafted measurement vector from
MC and the sampled uncompromised measurement vector MUi . Here, MC|Ui is a crafted
measurement vector with MC|Ui = d. The uncompromised measurement vectors in M U
can be randomly selected from the attacker’s alternative dataset.
Algorithm 2 describes a high-level approach to generate adversarial perturbations
regardless of uncompromised measurements. The algorithm first builds a set of crafted
measurement vector M U C based on M U and MC , and then starts an iteration over M U C.
The iteration process is limited to M axItera times to control the maximum time cost. The
purpose is to find a universal ∆ that can cause a portion of the vectors in M U C misclassified
by fθ . The function sampleEva described in Algorithm 3 evaluates M U C and Y with the
ML model fθ and returns the classification accuracy. λ ∈ (0, 1] is a constant chosen by
the attacker to determine the attack’s success rate in M U C according to ∆. During each
searching iteration, algorithm 2 builds and maintains the perturbation ∆ increasingly using
an adversarial perturbation generation algorithms, as shown by Line 10 in Algorithm 2. We
will propose our methods to handle this problem in the next subsections.
Figure 4.4 presents a simple illustration of the iteration process in Algorithm 1. We
assume there are three sensors’ measurements M = [m0 , m1 , m2 ] and only one sensor’s
measurement m0 = α is compromised by the attacker. The yellow, green and orange shallow
areas in the plane M0 = α represent the possible adversarial examples of the crafted
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Figure 4.4: Iteration illustration.
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measurement vector MC|U0 , MC|U1 , and MC|U2 , respectively, where Ui are randomly
sampled measurements of uncompromised sensors (m1 and m2 ). The initial point M (red
F) iterates twice (r0 and r1 ) and finally reaches M ∗ with the universal perturbation vector
∆. Therefore, M ∗ is a valid adversarial example for all MC|Ui (i ∈ {0, 1, 2}).
Comparison of Methods: Our approach is different from [76] in several aspects. First,
the approach proposed in [76] has identical adversarial perturbations for different ML
inputs while our approach actually generates distinct perturbations for each M . Second,
the approach in [76] builds universal perturbations regardless of the real-time ML inputs.
However, as the attacker has already compromised a portion of measurements, it is more
effective to take advantage of the obtained knowledge. In other words, our perturbations are
‘universal’ for MU but ‘distinct’ for M . Finally, the intrinsic properties of CPSs require
the attacker to generate a valid adversarial example within a sampling period while there is
no enforced limitation of the iteration time in [76].

4.4.2

Linear Equality Constraints Analysis

As shown in [35] and [89], the fundamental philosophy of AML can be represented as (4.5).

M ∗ = M + ∆ = M + ∇M L(fθ (M ), Y )

(4.5)

However, directly following the gradient will not guarantee the adversarial examples meet
the constraints in (4.2) and (4.4). With the constraints imposed by the physical system, the
attacker is no longer able to freely add perturbation to original input using the raw gradient
of the input vector. In this subsection, we will analyze how the linear equality constraints
will affect the way to generate perturbation and use a simple example for illustration.
Under the threat model proposed in Section 4.3.2, the constraint of (4.3c) is always met
due to the properties of the physical systems. We then consider the constraint (4.3d).
Theorem 4.1. The sufficient and necessary condition to meet constraint (4.3d) is Φk×r ∆C =
0.
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Proof. If we replace MC∗ in equation (4.3d) with equation (4.3b), we can get Φk×r MC∗ =
Φk×r (MC +∆C ) = Φk×r MC +Φk×r ∆C = Φ̃. From equation (3c) we can learn that Φk×r MC =
Φ̃. Therefore, we have Φk×r ∆C = 0 and prove Theorem 4.1.
From Theorem 4.1 we can also derive a very useful corollary, as shown below.
Corollary 4.2. If ∆C0 , ∆C1 , ..., ∆Cn are valid perturbation vectors that follow the
P
constraints, then we have ∆C 0 = ni=0 ai · ∆Ci is also a valid perturbation for the constraint
Φk×r .
Proof. We have Φk×r ∆C 0 = Φk×r

Pn

i=0 ai · ∆Ci =

Pn

i=0

ai · Φk×r ∆Ci . Since ∆Ci is a valid

perturbation vector and Φ∆Ci = 0, we have Φk×r ∆C 0 = 0 and prove Corollary 4.2.
Theorem 4.1 indicates that the perturbation vector to be added to the original
measurements must be a solution of the homogeneous linear equations Φk×r X = 0. However,
is this condition always met? We present Theorem 4.3 to answer this question,.
Theorem 4.3. In practical scenarios, the attacker can always find a valid solution
(perturbation) that meets the linear equality constraints imposed by the physical systems.

Proof. Due to the intrinsic property of the targeted system, equation (3c) is naturally met,
which indicates that there is always a solution for the nonhomogeneous linear equations
Φk×r X = Φ̃. Accordingly, we have Rank(Φk×r ) ≤ r. Moreover, if Rank(Φk×r ) = r, there will
be one unique solution for equation (4.3c), which means the measurements of compromised
sensors are constant.

The constant measurements are contradictory to the purpose of

deploying CPSs. In practical scenarios, M is changing over time, so that Rank(Φk×r ) < r
and the homogeneous linear equation Φk×r X = 0 will have infinite solutions. Therefore, the
attacker can always build a valid adversarial example that meets the constraints.

We utilize a simplified example to illustrate how the constraints will affect the generation
of perturbations, as shown in Figure 4.5. According to 4.5, measurement M should move a
small step (perturbation) to the gradient direction (direction 1 in Figure 4.5) to increase the
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loss most rapidly. However, as shown by the contour lines in Figure 4.5, the measurement
M is always forced to be on the straight line y = 2 − 2x, which is the projection of the
intersection of the two surfaces. Accordingly, instead of following the raw gradient, M
should move forward to direction 2 to increase the loss. Therefore, although at a relatively
slow rate, it is still possible for the attacker to increase the loss under the constraints.

4.4.3

Adversarial Example Generation under Linear Equality
Constraint

The common method of solving optimization problems using gradient descent under
constraints is projected gradient descent (PGD). However, since neural networks are generally
not considered as convex functions [21], PGD cannot be used to generate adversarial examples
directly. We propose the design of a simple but effective search algorithm to generate the
adversarial examples under physical linear equality constraints.
Algorithm 4: Best-Effort Search (Linear Equality)
1 Input: ∆, fθ , C, M , step, size, Φ, Y
2 Output: v
3 function genEqPer(∆, fθ , C, M, step, size, Φ, Y )
4
initialize v = ∆
5
initialize stepN um = 0
6
while stepN um ≤ step − 1 do
7
if fθ0 0 (M + v) doesn’t equals Y then
8
return v
9
end
10
r = eqOneStep(fθ , C, M + v, size, Φ, Y )
11
update v = v + r
12
stepN um = stepN um + 1
13
end
14
return v
15 end

As discussed in subsection 4.4.2, the perturbation ∆C needs to be a solution of Φk×r X =
0. We use n = Rank(Φk×r ) to denote the rank of the matrix Φk×r , where 0 < n < r. It
is obvious that the solution set of homogeneous linear equation Φk×r X = 0 will have r − n
basic solution vectors. We use I = [i0 , i1 , ..., ir−n−1 ]T to denote the index of independent
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Figure 4.5: Linear equality constraint illustration.
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variables in the solution set, D = [d0 , d1 , ..., dn−1 ]T to denote the index of corresponding
dependent variables, and Bn×(r−n) to denote the linear dependency matrix of XI and XD .
Clearly, we have XDn×1 = Bn×(r−n) XI(r−n)×1 . For convenience, we will use [I, D, B] =
dependency(Φk×r ) to describe the process of getting I, D, B from matrix Φk×r .
As shown in Algorithm 4, the function genEqPer takes ∆ as an input and outputs a
valid perturbation v for M . Algorithm 4 keeps executing eqOneStep for multiple times
defined by step to generate a valid v increasingly. Function eqOneStep performs a singlestep attack for the input vector and returns a one-step perturbation r that matches the
constraints defined by Φ, which is shown in Algorithm 5. Due to Corollary 4.2, ∆ and v will
also follow the constraints. To decrease the iteration time, similar to [75], the algorithm will
return the crafted adversarial examples immediately as long as fθ0 0 misclassifies the input
measurement vector M + v, as shown by Line 7 in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 5: One Step Attack Constraint ∆C
1 Input: fθ , C, M , size, Φ, Y
2 Output: r
3 function eqOneStep(fθ , C, M, size, Φk×r , Y )
4
calculate gradient vector G = ∇M L(fθ (M ), Y )
5
set all elements of GU in G to zero
6
define G0 = GC
7
obtain tuple [I, D, B] = dependency(Φk×r )
8
update G0D = BG0I in G0
9
 = size/max(abs(G0 ))
10
return r = G
11 end

The philosophy of function eqOneStep in algorithm 5 is very straightforward. From
the constraint Matrix Φ, we can get the independent variables I, dependent variables D
and the dependency matrix B between them. We will simply keep the gradient values of I
and use them to compute the corresponding values of D (Line 7) so that the final output
perturbation r will follow Φ. The constant factor size defines the largest modification the
attacker can make to a specific measurement to control the search speed.
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4.4.4

Adversarial Example Generation under Linear Inequality
Constraint

Algorithm 6: Non-Constraint Perturbation.
0
1 Input: fθ0 , U , M , size, Y
2 Output: r
0
3 function freeStep(fθ0 , U, M, size, Y )
4
calculate gradient vector G = ∇M L(fθ0 0 (M ), Y )
5
set elements in GU to zero
6
 = size/max(abs(G))
7
return r = G
8 end

Linear inequality constraints are very in real-world CPS applications, like the water
flow constraints in Figure 4.3.

Due to measurement noise, real-world systems usually

tolerate distinctions between measurements and expectation values as long as the distinctions
are smaller than predefined thresholds, which also brings inequality constraints to data.
Meanwhile, a linear equality constraint can be represented by two linear inequality
constraints.

As shown in equation (4.4), linear inequality constraints define the valid

measurement subspace whose boundary hyper-planes are defined by equation (4.2). In
general, the search process under linear inequality constraints can be categorized into two
situations. The first situation is when a point (measurement vector) is in the subspace and
meets all constraints, while the second situation happens when the point reaches boundaries.
Due to the property of physical systems, the original point M will naturally meet all the
constraints. As shown in Algorithm 7, to increase the loss, the original point will first try
to move a step following the gradient direction through the function freeStep defined in
Algorithm 6. Algorithm 6 is very similar to the FGM algorithm [89] but no perturbation
is added to MU , namely rU = 0, which is similar to the saliency map function used in
[84]. After that, the new point M 0 is checked with equation (4.4) to find if all inequality
constraints are met. If all constraints were met, the moved step was valid and we can update
M = M 0 . If M 0 violates some constraints in Φ, we will take all the violated constraints and
make a real-time constraint matrix ΦV , where V is the index vector of violated constraints.
We now convert the inequality constraint problem to the equality constraint problem with
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Algorithm 7: Best-Effort Search (Linear Inequality)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Input: ∆, fθ0 0 , C, U , M , step, size, Φ, Φ̃, Y
Output: v
function genIqPer(∆, fθ0 0 , C, U, M, step, size, Φ, Φ̃, Y )
initialize pioneer = ∆, valid = pioneer
initialize stepN um = 0
initialize V as empty // violated constrain index
while stepN um ≤ step − 1 do
if fθ0 0 (M + valid) doesn’t equals Y then
break
end
chkRst = chkIq(Φ, Φ̃, M + pioneer, C)
if chkRst is empty then
valid = pioneer
r = freeStep(fθ0 0 , U, M + valid, size, Y )
pioneer = valid + r
reset V to empty
else
extend V with chkRst
define Φ0 = ΦV // real-time constraints
r = eqOneStep(fθ0 0 , C, M + valid, size, Φ0 , Y )
pioneer = valid + r
end
stepN um = stepN um + 1
end
return v = valid
end
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the new constraint matrix ΦV and the original point M . M will then try to take a step
using the eqOneStep function described in Algorithm 5 with the new constraint matrix
ΦV . Again, we check whether the new reached point meets all the constraints. If there are
still violated constraints, we extend V with the new violated constraints. The search process
repeats until reaching a valid M 0 that meets all the constraints. For simplicity, we will use
chkRst = chkIq(Φ, Φ̃, M 0 , C) to denote the checking process of a single search in one step
movement, where chkRst is the index vector of the violated constraints in the search.
Similar to Figure 4.5, a simple example is shown in Figure 4.6. To increase the loss,
the initial point a will take a small step following the gradient direction and reach point b.
Since b meets the constraints, it is a valid point. After that, b will move a step following the
gradient direction and reach point c0 . However, point c0 violates the constraint β and the
movement is not valid. As we have point b is valid, we construct a linear equality constraint
problem with constraint α which is parallel to β. With constraint α, point b will move a step
to point c which is also a valid point. Point c then repeats the search process and increases
the loss gradually. The real-time equality constraint is only used once. When a new valid
point is reached, it empties the previous equality constraints and tries the gradient direction
first.

4.5

Experimental Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate our ConAML frameworks in CPS control domain with three
different CPS applications, including incident detection in transportation system, false data
injection attack in power system state estimation, and anomaly detection in water treatment
systems. We analyze and examine the practical requirements for launching adversarial
attacks in the three CPS applications, and summarize the corresponding constraints in Table
4.2.
From Table 4.2, we can learn that the attacker needs to overcome all constraints for
power grids and water systems CPSs in our study case, while the knowledge constraint is
released for the transportation study case.
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Figure 4.6: Best-Effort Search (linear inequality).

Table 4.2: Study Case Constraints
Constraints
Transportation
Model Constraint
F
Sensor Constraint
F
Knowledge Constraint
Physical Constraint
F
Time Constraint
F
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Power Grids
F
F
F
F
F

Water Systems
F
F
F
F
F

We will present the detailed attack scenarios for each study case in the subsections. The
deep learning models are implemented using Tensorflow and the Keras library and are trained
on a Windows 10 machine with an Intel i7 CPU.

4.5.1

Case Study: Incident detection in transportation systems

Background: Deep learning-based incident detection
Traffic incidents can be a great threat to people’s lives and property, and timely incident
detection is very important for life-saving.

On the other hand, with the development

of the Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), different sensing techniques are employed
in highways and provides massive heterogeneous data that contains the real-time traffic
information, such as average speed, total traffic flow, and average occupancy. With big data
techniques, the high granularity traffic data can be taken advantage of for many important
applications in ITS, such as traffic prediction [117, 64, 100] and incident detection.
In recent years, deep neural networks have been widely studied to be the key techniques
for incident detection [40, 62, 115, 87, 86, 120] . For example, an LSTM model can learn the
time-series pattern of the traffic information changing when an incident happens. With fine
tunned parameters, the DNNs achieve state-of-the-art performance in transportation system
incident detection.
Adversarial attacks for DNN-based incident detection
In general, the incident detection DNNs can be considered as a binary classifier, with the
input features contains the traffic information (speed). The DNN will predict if there is
an incident in the given timeslot based on the real-time speed data. The main metrics to
evaluate the performance of a trained incident detection DNN is are detection rate and false
alarm.
The state-of-the-art models in the literature can achieve an around 90% detection rate
and below around 10% false alarm rate. In this study case, we consider the attack scenario
that a malicious attacker aims to disable the availability of the DNN-based incident detection
in a transportation system. The adversarial attacker would launch a false-positive attack
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that aims to deceive the incident detection DNN to predict the wrong result (incident) based
on the normal traffic data.
As demonstrated in Table 4.2, the adversarial attacker of incident detection needs to
overcome model constraint, sensor constraint, physical constraint, and time constraint. We
assume the attacker can compromise a portion of speed sensors in a highway and can freely
modify the measurements of the compromised sensors. Meanwhile, due to the continuous
property of the highway, the difference between the speed measurements of adjacent sensors
should be small, namely the Physical Constraint is kSi,t − Si−1,t k ≤ , where  is a constant
defined by the traffic condition. However, many transportation systems make the realtime speed measurements public available, which enables the attacker to know the real-time
measurements of uncompromised speed sensors. Therefore, there is no knowledge constraint
for the adversarial attacker who targets transportation system CPSs.
Simulation Evaluation
Dataset: Different datasets were used in previous literature. In this study case, we study the
traffic data of US I-880 N highway. On the one hand, it was used in previous research [30, 40].
On the other hand, the California Department of Transportation provides a convenient public
portal for traffic data collection, and the incident data and traffic data of I-880 N highway
are publicly available on the Caltrans Performance Measurement system (PeMS) [82].
We collected all the I-880 N incident data of the year 2017, the incident types in the
data include traffic collision, hit and run injury, car fire, traffic break, animal hazard, and
construction. We collect 7,111 incident data records in total. We then collected the related
traffic speed data from 98 sensor stations in I-880 N. The sensors report the average speed
of the monitoring every five minutes. For incident that happened in slot n, we collected the
corresponding speed data from time slot n − 2 to time slot n + 2, and the regulated speed
data structure is demonstrated by Fig. 4.7. We label all incident traffic data records as 0.
We then randomly sample 7,111 normal traffic data records and label them as 1.
Incident detection DNN: LSTM DNNs are widely employed for incident detection in
previous literature since they have intrinsic advantages in learning the time-series data [115,
40]. In this case study, we train two LSTM DNNs for the defender and the attacker with
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the regulated DNN described above for traffic data classification, and the structures of two
DNNs are demonstrated in Tabel 4.3. We randomly split the dataset into the training part
(85%) and the testing part (15%). Both models are trained with a 0.0001 learning rate, 512
batch size, a mean squared error loss function, and a Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
optimizer. Finally, the defender’s DNN achieves an 87.4% detection rate with 10.1% false
alarm rate while the attacker DNN’s detection rate is 86.5% and the false alarm rate is 9.7%.
Adversarial Attacks: We examine the traffic speed data of I-880 N highway, and set the  =
8.5 for the physical constraint. The I-880 N highway has 98 speed sensors in the DNN systems
in total. In our simulations, we assume there are 5, 10, 15, 20 sensors being compromised
by the adversarial attacker respectively, and the sensors are randomly selected. We launch
the adversarial attack to the defender’s detection DNN with our ConAML algorithm, and
the result is demonstrated in Table 4.4.
From Table 4.4, we can learn that our adversarial attack can significantly increase the
false positive rate of the detection DNN with small modifications to the speed measurements.
In general, with more sensors being compromised, the attacker can have a better attack
performance.

4.5.2

Case Study: False Data Injection Attack Detection in Power
System State Estimation

Background: State Estimation and FDIA
Power grids are critical infrastructures that connect power generation to end customers
through transmission and distribution grids. In recent decades, the rapid development of
technologies in sensors, communication, and computing enables various applications in the
power grid. However, as the power system becomes more complex and dependent on the
information and communications technology, the threat of cyber-attacks also increases, and
the cyber-power system becomes more vulnerable [98, 101]. The cyberattack to the Ukraine
power grid in 2015 is a well-known example [63].
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Figure 4.7: Speed Data Structure

Table 4.3: Incident Detection LSTM
Layer
Defender
Attacker

1
16 LSTM
24 LSTM

2
16 LSTM
0.25 Dropout

3
0.25 Dropout
2 Softmax

4
2 Softmax
-

Table 4.4: Incident Detection Evaluation Result
Case False Positive Rate Ave L1 -Norm (mile/h)
5
82.8%
5.9
10
71.4%
6.3
15
83.7%
7.1
20
87.7%
2.8
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State estimation is a backbone of various crucial applications in power system control that
has been enabled by large scale sensing and communication technologies, such as SCADA.
Generally speaking, the state estimation is used to estimate the state of each bus, such as
voltage angles and magnitudes, in the power grid through analyzing other measurements.
We denote the vector of state variables as x = [x1 , x2 , ..., xn ]T , and the meters’
measurements vector as z = [z1 , z2 , ..., zm ]T , where xi ∈ R and zj ∈ R. The general state
estimation process can then be represented as follow:

z = h(x) + e

(4.6)

where e is the measurement error vectors and h is a function of x. In practice, a simplified
DC power flow state estimation can be used to decrease the process time cost. A DC model
can then be represented as equation (4.7).

z = Hx + e

(4.7)

The matrix Hm×n is determined by the configurations, topology and physical parameters
of the power system.
In general, a weighted least squares estimation (WLS) approach is used to solve equation
(4.7). The estimated state vector x̂ can then be computed through equation (4.8):

x̂ = (HT WH)−1 HT Wz

(4.8)

where matrix W is the covariance matrix of the meters’ statistical measurement errors.
The measurements z may contain bad measurements due to possible meter errors or cyber
attacks. Therefore, state estimation usually integrates with a linear residual-based detection
approach to remove faulty measurements according to the difference between z and Hx̂. If
the L2 -norm of kz − Hx̂k is larger than a threshold τ that is selected according to a false
alarm rate, the measurement z will be considered as polluted and be removed.
The residual-based detection involves non-linear computation (L2 -Norm), however,
research has shown that a false measurement vector follows linear equality constraints can
be used to pollute the normal measurements without being detected. In 2009, Liu et al.
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proposed the false data injection attack (FDIA) that can bypass the residual-based detection
scheme and finally pollute the result of state estimation [66]. In particular, if the attacker
knows H, she/he could construct a faulty vector a that meets the linear constraint Ba = 0,
where B = H(HT H)−1 HT −I, and the crafted faulty measurements z+a will not be detected
by the system, as demonstrated below.
The FDIA enables an attacker to generate a false measurement vector a = [a1 , a2 , ..., am ]T
to be added to legitimate measurement z, so that the polluted measurements will be za =
z + a. The original FDIA proposed in [66] shows that if the attacker knows the matrix
H, she/he can construct a = Hc (c represents the estimation error) that can bypass the
fault detection in state estimation, as shown by equation (4.9), where x̂bad and x̂ denote the
estimated x using za and z respectively.

kza − Hx̂bad k = kz + a − H(x̂ + c)k

(4.9a)

= kz − Hx̂ + (a − Hc)k

(4.9b)

= kz − Hx̂k ≤ τ

(4.9c)

Meanwhile, equation (4.10) from [66] provides an efficient way to generate a valid vector
a, where P = H(HT H)−1 HT and matrix B = P − I.

a = Hc ⇔ Pa = PHc ⇔ Pa = Hc ⇔ Pa = a

(4.10a)

⇔ Pa − a = 0 ⇔ (P − I)a = 0

(4.10b)

⇔ Ba = 0

(4.10c)

Equation (4.10c) indicates that a is a solution of the homogeneous equation BX = 0. If
an attacker compromised k measurements in z, and there will be k non-zero elements in a.
Equation (4.10c) will then become:
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B’a’ = 0

(4.11)

where B’m×k and a’m×k are corresponding columns and rows sampled from B and a
respectively according to the k compromised measurements. Liu et al. proved that as long
as k > m − n, non-zero a always exists.
As FDIA presented a serious threat to the power grid security, many detection and
mitigation schemes to defend FDIA are proposed, including strategical measurement
protection [12] and PMU-based protection [112].

In recent years, detection schemes

based on ML, especially neural networks, have been proposed and become popular
[83, 111, 44, 47, 10, 81, 105] in the literature. The ML-based detection does not require
extra hardware equipment and achieve the state-of-the-art detection performance. However,
in this section, we will demonstrate that ML approaches are vulnerable to ConAML. The ML
models in previous research are trained to distinguish normal measurement z and poisoned
measurement z + a. Our ConAML algorithms allow the attacker to generate an adversarial
perturbation v that meets the constraint Bv = 0 for his/her original false measurement
z + a and obtain a new false measurement vector zadv = z + a + v that will be classified as
normal measurements by the ML-based FDIA detection models. The matrix B then acts
as the constraint matrix Φ defined in equation (4.3). Meanwhile, zadv can naturally bypass
the traditional residual-based detection approach since the total injected false vector a + v
meets the constraint B(a + v) = Ba + Bv = 0. Our experiment in the next subsection will
show that our ConAML algorithms can significantly decrease the detection performance of
the ML-based detection schemes.
Experiment Design and Evaluation
We select the IEEE standard 10-machine 39-bus system as the power grid system as it is one
of the benchmark systems in related research. The structure of the IEEE 39-bus system is
shown in Figure 4.8. The features used for ML model training are the power flow (Ampere)
measurements of each branches. The system has 46 branches so that there there will be 46
features for the ML models.
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In our experiment, the goal of the attacker is to implement a false negative attack that
makes the polluted measurements zadv pass the detection of the ML models, namely to fool
the models to misclassify the false measurements as normal.
We utilize the MATPOWER [121] library to derive the H matrix of the system and
simulate the power flow measurement data. We also implement the FDIA using MATLAB
to generate false measurements. Both the power flow measurements and false measurements
follow Gaussian distributions. We make two datasets for the defender and the attacker
respectively. For each dataset, there are around 25,000 records with half records are polluted
with FDIA. We label the normal measurements as 0 and false measurements as 1 and use
one-hot encoding for the labels.
We investigate the scenarios that there are 10, 13, and 15 measurements being
compromised by the attacker, with the randomly generated compromised index vector C
and corresponding constraint matrix Φ (BC in (4.11)). We generate 1,000 false measurement
vectors in each test datasets.
After that, we train two deep learning models based on the training datasets accordingly,
with 75% records in the dataset used for training and 25% for testing. We use simple fully
connected neural networks as the ML models, as shown in Table 4.5. Both the models are
trained with a 0.0001 leaning rate, 512 batch size, and a mean squared error loss function.
The training process is around one minutes for each model.
Table 4.6 summarizes the detection performance of fθ under adversarial attacks generated
by our ConAML algorithms. From the table, we can learn that the ConAML attacks can
effectively decrease the detection accuracy of the ML models used for FDIA detection and
inject considerable bad data to the power systems. In all three study cases, the detection
accuracy of the defender’s model decreased to below 30% under the adversarial attacks.
Meanwhile, we can observe that the L2 -Norm are very large, especially for the ’15’ study
case.
As shown in Figure 4.9, by comparing the evaluation results of different cases, we can learn
that compromising more sensors cannot guarantee better performances in attack detection.
This is due to the different physical constraints imposed by the system. However, with more
compromised sensors, the attacker can usually obtain a larger size of the injected bad data.
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Figure 4.8: IEEE 39-Bus System [8] [29].

Table 4.5: Model Structure - FDIA
Layer
f
f0
0
46 Input
46 Input
1
32 Dense ReLU
30 Dense ReLU
2
48 Dense ReLU
40 Dense ReLU
3
56 Dense ReLU
30 Dense ReLU
4
48 Dense ReLU
Dropout 0.25
5
32 Dense ReLU
20 Dense ReLU
6
Dropout 0.25
Dropout 0.25
7
16 Dense ReLU 2 Dense Softmax
8
Dropout 0.25
9
2 Dense Softmax
-

Table 4.6: Evaluation Result Summary
Attack

Case Accu L2 -Norm Time (ms)
10
14.4%
1843.2
131.9
black-box
13
4.3%
4786.72
209.6
15
28.1%
9079.02
163.3
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In our experiments, the time cost is relatively higher due to the universal adversarial
measurements algorithm, as shown in Figure 4.10. However, the time cost is still efficient
for many CPS applications in practice. For example, the sampling period of the traditional
SCADA system used in the electrical power system is 2 to 4 seconds. In practical scenarios,
the time cost of adversarial example generation depends on the computational resource of
the attacker. With the possible optimization and upgrade in software and hardware, the
time cost can be further reduced.

4.5.3

Case Study: Water Treatment System

Background: SWaT Dataset
We study the linear inequality physical constraints based on the Secure Water Treatment
(SWaT) proposed in [34]. SWaT is a scaled-down system but with fully operational water
treatment functions. The testbed has six main processes and consists of cyber control (PLCs)
and physical components of the water treatment facility. The SWaT dataset, generated by
the SWaT testbed, is a public dataset to investigate the cyber attacks on CPSs. The raw
dataset has 946,722 samples with each sample comprised of 51 attributes, including the
measurements of 25 sensors and the states of 26 actuators. Each sample in the dataset was
labeled with normal or attack. The detailed description of the SWaT dataset can be found
in [34] and [56].
The SWaT dataset is an important resource to study anomaly detection in CPSs. In
2017, Inoue et al. used unsupervised machine learning, including Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) and SVM, to perform anomaly detection based on the SWaT dataset [45]. By
comparison, Kravchik et al. employed Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) and achieved
a better false positive rate [53]. In 2019, [28] proposed a data-driven framework to derive
invariant rules for anomaly detection for CPS and utilized SWaT to evaluate their approach.
Other research related to the SWaT dataset can be found in [18, 27, 5].
As shown in Table 4.7, the SWaT dataset includes the measurements from five kinds of
analog components (25 sensors in total) whose measurements are used as the input features
in previous anomaly detection ML models. Our experiments aims to demonstrate that the
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Figure 4.9: Performance of black-box attacks according to λ with step = 40, size = 20.
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Figure 4.10: Time cost of black-box attacks according to λ with step = 40, size = 20.

Table 4.7: SWaT Analog Components
Symbol
LIT
FIT
AIT
PIT
DPIT

Description
Unit
Level Indication Transmitter
mm
Flow Indication Transmitter
m3 /hr
Analyzer Indication Transmitter
uS/cm
Pressure Indication Transmitter
kP a
Differential Pressure Ind Transmitter
kP a

75

ML models used for anomaly detection are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However,
due to the physical properties of the SWaT testbed, the sensor’s measurements are not
independent but with linear inequality constraints.
In our experiment, we consider the scenario that the adversarial attacker compromises
the FIT components to inject bad adversarial water flow measurements while bypassing the
ML-based anomaly detection system. We then examined the SWaT testbed structure and
find out that there are apparent linear inequality constraints among the FIT measurements.
We checked the SWaT dataset and observed that all the normal examples in the dataset
meet the constraints. We also contacted the managers of the SWaT testbed and verified our
find. The linear inequality constraints of the seven FIT measurements in the dataset are
defined by the structure of the water pipelines and the placement of the sensors, as shown
in equation 4.12, where 1 and 2 are two constants of the system’s noise tolerance. We
utilized the double value of the maximum difference of the corresponding measurements in
the SWaT dataset to estimate 1 and 2 , and we had 1 = 0.0403 and 2 = 0.153. Therefore,
the adversarial measurements should also follows the same linear inequality constraints to
avoid being noticed by the system operator.

FIT301 ≤ FIT201

(4.12a)

kFIT401 − FIT501k ≤ 1

(4.12b)

k(FIT502 + FIT503) − (FIT501 + FIT504)k ≤ 2

(4.12c)

Based on (4.4), we can represent (4.12) as follow. And MC is the vector of measurements
of FIT201, FIT301, FIT401, FIT501, FIT502, FIT503 and FIT504 accordingly.
Experimental Design and Evaluation
Similar to the power system study case, we generate two training datasets for the defender’s
model fθ and the attacker’s model fθ0 0 respectively by poisoning the normal measurements
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with Gaussian noise. The ML models is trained to distinguish the normal measurement data
and the poisoned measurements (anomaly).
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In the Swat dataset, we extracted the normal records which were sampled when the whole
system was working steadily. We also removed all the actuators’ features. Here, we denote
the extracted records as De . After that, we randomly picked out three test datasets from
De as the with each test dataset contains 1000 records. We added Gaussian noise to the
compromised measurements of records in all test datasets. We checked the polluted record
every time when a noise vector was added to ensure all the records in test datasets meet
the linear inequality constraints. Here, we denote the rest records of De as Dtrain which
contains 120,093 records with each record having 25 features in our implementation. We
randomly and equally split Dtrain into Ddef ender and Dattacker for the defender and attacker
respectively and pollute half records with normally-distributed random noise in Dtrain and
Ddef ender . The polluted records in Ddef end and Dattacker are labeled with 1 and the rest with
0. We allow the records in Dtrain and Ddef end with label 1 to violate the constraints since
the ML models are also expected to detect the obviously anomalous measurements.
We utilize Ddef end and Dattack to train the ML models fθ and fθ0 0 for the defender and
attacker respectively. Again, 75% records in the both datasets were used for training the 25%
records for testing during the training process. Similar to FDIA experiment, we utilize fully
connected neural networks and the structures are shown in Table 4.8. Through parameter
tuning, model fθ and fθ0 0 achieves 97.2% and 96.7% accuracy respectively.
After that, we consider the scenarios that there were 2, 5, and 7 FIT measurements
compromised by the attacker and generate the related test datasets. The goal of the attacker
is to generate the adversarial FIT measurements with the linear inequality constraints
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defined by equation (4.12) so that the poisoned measurements can be classified as ‘normal’
by the defender’s ML model fθ .
Table 4.9 summarizes the evaluation performances of ConAML attacks. From the table,
we can learn that the ConAML framework can still effectively decrease the detection accuracy
of the ML models for black-box attacks. Similar to the power system study case, a larger
number of compromised sensors cannot produce a better performance in bypassing the
detection. The reason for this result is that more compromised sensors will also have more
complex constraints between their measurements. Meanwhile, more constraints will increase
the computation overhead of the best effort search algorithms since there will be a ‘larger’
constraint matrix.
Figure 4.11 demonstrated the trend of the detection accuracy and injected bad data size
according to λ. From the figure, we can learn that, with the λ increases, the probability
of the adversarial examples being detected also increases. This matches the intuition that
if an adversarial example can obtain higher successful attack probability with the sampling
measurement set, the probability of evading detection will also increase. Meanwhile, a smaller
injected data size is expected to make the adversarial examples look more ‘normal’ to the
detection model.

4.6

Extension: Non-Linear Constraints

Many other machine learning-based applications in the CPS domains, for instance, load
forecasting in power and water systems, traffic forecasting in transportation systems, have
nonlinear constraints. The non-linear constraints can be very complex in various CPSs and
cannot be covered in one study.
In general, similar to linear constraints, the k nonlinear constraints of the compromised
measurements can be represented as equation (4.13), where µi is a nonlinear function of MC .
We now investigate a special case of the nonlinear constraints. If there exists a subset
of the compromised measurements, in which each measurement can be represented as an
explicit function of the measurements in the complement set, the attacker will also be able
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Table 4.8: Model Structure - Water Treatment
Layer
f
f0
0
25 Input
25 Input
1
20 Dense ReLU
24 Dense ReLU
2
40 Dense ReLU
32 Dense ReLU
3
30 Dense ReLU
32 Dense ReLU
4
Dropout 0.25
16 Dense ReLU
5
20 Dense ReLU 2 Dense Softmax
6
Dropout 0.25
7
2 Dense Softmax
-

Table 4.9: Evaluation Result Summary
Attack

Case Accu L2 -Norm Time (ms)
2
1.3%
0.309
17.5
black-box
5
2.3%
0.340
111.7
7
1.14%
0.411
451.8
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Figure 4.11: Performance of black-box attacks according to λ with step = 50, size = 0.06.
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to generate the perturbation accordingly. We use P = [p0 , p1 , ..., pn−1 ] to denote the
index vector of the former measurement set, and use Q = [q0 , q1 , ..., qr−n−1 ] to denote the
index vector of the complement set. We can then represent (4.13) as (4.14), where Ξ =
[ξ0 , ξ1 , ..., ξn−1 ] is a vector of explicit functions.



µ0 (mc0 , mc1 , ..., mcr−1 ) = 0




 µ (m , m , ..., m ) = 0
1
c0
c1
cr−1


...




 µ (m , m , ..., m ) = 0
k−1
c0
c1
cr−1

(4.13)




mp0 = ξ0 (mq0 , mq1 , ..., mqr−n−1 )




 m = ξ (m , m , ..., m
p1
1
q0
q1
qr−n−1 )


...




 m
pn−1 = ξn−1 (mq0 , mq1 , ..., mqr−n−1 )

(4.14)

Apparently, the roles of MQ and MP in (4.14) are similar to the MI and MD in linear
constraints correspondingly. Instead of a linear matrix, the function set Ξ represents the
dependency between MP and MQ .

The nonlinear constraints make properties such as

Theorem 1 infeasible. To meet the constraints, the attacker needs to find the perturbation ∆Q
first and obtain MQ∗ by adding it to MQ . After that, the attacker can compute MP∗ = Ξ(MQ∗ )
.
The above case of nonlinear constraints is special and may not be scalable to various
practical applications. Although there are different types of nonlinear systems, they can be
generalized using piece-wise linear constraints by setting proper ranges and breakpoints. We
leave this as an open problem for future work.
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Chapter 5
Adversarial Defense in CPS: Random
Padding Framework
In this chapter, we study the defense mechanisms for adversarial attacks in cyber-physical
systems. We review and study several state-of-the-art defense mechanisms proposed in the
computer vision domain, and analyze and evaluate their performance for CPS applications.
Meanwhile, we demonstrate that some state-of-the-art adversarial defense methods, such
as adversarial detection and input reconstruction, have intrinsic constraints for control
domain adversarial attacks. To solve this, we propose a random input padding framework.
Simulation evaluation shows that our framework can significantly decrease the effectiveness
of adversarial examples in both customer domain (energy theft detection) and control domain
(FDIA detection) adversarial attacks.

5.1

Defense Requirements

White-box adversarial attacks allow the attacker to have access to the target DNN, which
is a common setting in previous literature and has been extensively studied since it helps
researchers to learn the weakness of DNNs more directly [108]. Robust against white-box
adversarial attacks is the desired property that the DNNs should maintain [104], especially
for critical infrastructure. In particular, the cyberattacks targeting critical CPSs are usually
nationwide and the attacker owns considerable resources, like the well-known Ukraine power
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grid attack in 2015 [63]. In this paper, we expect the defense mechanisms in DNN-based
control domain CPS application to be resilient to white-box adversarial attacks.

5.2

State-of-the-art Adversarial Defense Mechanisms

In this section, we review several state-of-the-art adversarial defense mechanisms, including
adversarial training, adversarial detection, and input reconstruction.
Adversarial Training
Adversarial training is one of the common methods to mitigate an adversarial attack [54,
91, 104]. The basic principle of adversarial training is to generate and include adversarial
examples in each data batch during the training stages. As the DNN is trained to recognize
adversarial examples, it becomes more robust.
Adversarial Detection
Adversarial detection aims to recognize adversarial examples at the DNN inference stage
[69, 73, 109]. In particular, a auxiliary binary classification DNN Fadv is trained with normal
records and corresponding adversarial examples [73] to detect if an input is an adversarial
example. The adversarial detection DNN Fadv will be employed first to recognize the input
records, and only the normal records will be fed into the original functional DNN.
Input Reconstruction
The input reconstruction mechanisms aim to recover the normal input records from possible
adversarial examples [38][72]. Typically, an autoencoder is used to reconstruct the model
inputs. Since the autoencoder is trained only with normal data records, it can learn the
overall distribution of the normal data. When an adversarial example is received, the
autoencoder can push the adversarial example to the manifolds of its legitimate records
[72]. Meanwhile, the divergence between the autoencoder’s input and output can also be
used as a metric for adversarial example detection.
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Figure 5.1: Adversarial Training

Figure 5.2: Adversarial Detection

Figure 5.3: Input Reconstruction
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5.3

State-of-the-art: Limitation Analysis

Through analysis, we find that the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms have intrinsic
limitations for adversarial defense in control domain CPS applications due to different attack
requirements and properties, as shown below:
Adversarial Training
Adversarial training needs to generate adversarial examples for each batch of data during
the training process, which increases the training computation overhead significantly. As
demonstrated by line 8 in Algorithm 5, to avoid being removed by the detection scheme, the
adversarial perturbations need to be projected to fit the constraint. The mapping process
will further significantly introduce computation overhead to the adversarial training process.
Therefore, adversarial training is not scalable to large systems that contain massive data
resources.
Adversarial Detection and Input Reconstruction
A common assumption of adversarial detection is that the adversarial examples follow a
different distribution from normal inputs. The assumption is reasonable in the computer
vision domain (the natural images will not contain the well-crafted perturbations) but not
applicable for control domain CPS applications.
As introduced in chapter 4, the manifold of the normal measurements can be represented
by the constraint Φk×r MC = Φ̃ empirically.

To bypass the built-in detection of CPS

application, the adversarial examples are also required to meet the constraint Φk×r MC∗ = Φ̃.
Intuitively, the crafted adversarial measurements share a similar manifold with the normal
measurements. Therefore, adversarial detection will not work effectively in control domain
CPS applications. This analysis can also be adapted to input reconstruction methods.
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5.4

Random Input Padding Framework

As discussed above, the adversarial defense in control domain CPS application is non-trivial
since the adversarial measurements share the same manifold as the normal measurements.
Given the victim model, the attacker generates the perturbation iteratively through a
gradient-based optimization process.

As presented in [54], the perturbation generated

by multi-step attacks usually has worse transferability, which indicates that adversarial
perturbation is highly likely to be unique for each given data point in the adversarial attacks.
Therefore, there is an intuition that the perturbation will no longer work if the input to the
model changes. Inspired by the stochastic-based defense mechanisms in the computer vision
field [72][107], we propose a random input padding defense framework to mitigate the effect
of adversarial attacks in the control domain CPS applications.
The philosophy of our random input padding framework is straightforward, and the
overall structure is shown in Fig 5.4. A random padding layer is added in front of the
DNN in both training and inference stages. In general, the measurements of the sensors z
are used as the features to train the detection models. Our framework firstly requires the
operator to pick a padding dimension number P (P > m) as the input feature numbers for
the DNN. Thereafter, we pad P − m zeros randomly to the plain inputs z and there will be
P − m padding scenarios in total. The DNN is then required to learn the pattern from the
plain measurements that are embedded into the padded inputs during the training process.
During the inference stage, when a new measurement vector z is received, the framework
randomly pads z to a P dimensional vector and feeds the padded vector to the DNN. Ideally,
the detection rate against adversarial attacks should be 1 −

1
P −m+1

(P ≥ m). The padding

framework also works with possible input reshape, as shown in Fig 5.4.
As the padding process is random for each z at the inference stage, the attacker (and
even the operator) cannot know the final DNN padded input vectors even when she/he
knows the whole framework. For white-box attacks, the attacker will be able to generate
perturbations for one of the P − m padding scenarios. Since the multi-steps perturbations
have relatively weak transferability, the adversarial attacks should have a lower success rate
under the random padding framework. Intuitively, a larger P will decrease the success rate
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of random inputs padding framework
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of adversarial attacks and finally increase the robustness of the DNN used for control domain
CPS applications.
Different from [107], our framework requires input data pre-processing (padding) during
the training stage and cannot be applied to a trained model directly. This is because the
measurement data of a specific control domain CPS should follow the manifold defined by
the physical property of the system, which will be destroyed if the measurement vectors
are reshaped, resized, or sampled directly. Meanwhile, our framework only increases the
computation of the training process slightly and is compatible with different neural networks.

5.5
5.5.1

Simulation Evaluation
Customer Domain CPS application: Energy Theft Detection

We analyze the properties of adversarial measurements and energy theft measurements and
find that their distribution should be different. We then employ the t-Distributed Stochastic
Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) tool to reduce the measurement vectors into 2-d vectors and
visualize their difference, as shown in Fig. 5.5.
From Fig. 5.5, we can learn that the manifolds of adversarial measurements and energy
theft measurements are different, which matches the assumptions of adversarial detection and
input reconstruction. We then generate a training dataset that contains 15,000 adversarial
measurement vectors and the same number of energy theft measurement vectors.

We

use the dataset to train an auxiliary binary classifier DNN, and the DNN achieves over
98% classification accuracy.

Therefore, adversarial detection can effectively distinguish

adversarial measurements. For input reconstruction, we trained an FNN autoencoder with
the normal energy theft measurements. After that, we feed the adversarial measurements to
the autoencoder first and forward the output of the autoencoder to the energy theft detection
DNN, the detection DNN then achieves over 97% detection accuracy.
We also evaluate the random padding framework, we train several LSTM DNNs with the
same structure with fRN N in Table 3.3 except for the input dimension (match the padding).
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Figure 5.5: Energy theft/adversarial measurements visualization (t-SNE dimensionality
reduction)

Figure 5.6: Detection recall of padded DNNs

Figure 5.7: Detection recall of padded DNNs under adversarial attacks

88

We select LSTM DNNs in our simulation due to their detection performance. The evaluation
results are demonstrated in Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7. From Fig. 5.7, we can learn that the
random padding framework significantly increases the robustness of DNNs under adversarial
attacks. In addition, from Fig. 5.6, we can learn that the padding process will not influence
the DNNs’ detection performance on normal inputs.

5.5.2

Control Domain CPS application: FDIA detection

We employ the algorithm described in [54] to evaluate the performance of adversarial
training in FDIA detection. We generate the adversarial measurements of all false records
in each batch during the training process with the real-time trained DNN and added them
to the training data. The training process takes 530 seconds to converge and achieves
98.5% overall detection accuracy and 99.2% detection recall of false measurements. For
comparison, the normal training process takes around 75 seconds to converge. Meanwhile,
we launch adversarial attacks to the adversarial trained DNN and the detection recall of
false measurements decreases to 15.6%. Therefore, adversarial training is not appropriate
for adversarial defense in FDIA detection.
We employ the adversarial detection methods described in [73] and generate the
adversarial examples of all false measurements in the original training dataset. We use
the original false measurements and their corresponding adversarial measurements to train a
binary classification DNN F adv . We empirically attempt different structures and parameters
of the F adv and observe that its performance is not reliable. The best classification accuracy
in our experiments is around 75%. As analyzed, we explain that this result is caused
by the similar manifolds shared between the false measurements za and the adversarial
measurements zadv . To verify our analysis, we utilize the t-SNE to visualize the manifolds
in 2-dimensions, as shown in Fig. 5.8. From Fig. 5.8, we can learn that the adversarial
measurements share a very similar manifolds with the normal false measurements. This
is due to the the physical property of the power system and the constraints. Therefore,
adversarial detection can not distinguish the adversarial measurements from model inputs
effectively in FDIA detection.
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Figure 5.8: FDIA adversarial measurements visualization (t-SNE dimensionality reduction)
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We utilize an autoencoder described in [72] and [38] to recover the general false
measurements from their adversarial measurements. Similar to adversarial detection, the
similar manifolds shared between the false measurements and adversarial measurements in
FDIA decreases the effectiveness of input construction. A basic FNN is trained as the
autoencoder fencoder with all records in Dtrain . We then evaluate the autoencoder loss of the
false measurements and adversarial measurements described in [72]. As shown in Fig. 5.9,
the loss of two kinds of measurement vectors is very close and difficult to separate.
We evaluate the defense performance of our random padding framework with three
different types of DNNs, including FNN, long short-term memory (LSTM, acts as RNN),
and CNN. We modify the number of the input neurons according to the padding number
P for all three DNNs. Meanwhile, we empirically select the kernel size of the CNN for
different P inputs in our experiments. The overall detection accuracy of three types of
DNNs under the random padding framework is shown in Fig. 5.10. We can learn that
with the padding number P increases, the detection accuracy of FNN and CNN decreases
gradually and becomes stable. The detection accuracy of FNN and CNN reaches aroung
96% and 95% respectively while RNN (LSTM) obtains a better performance (aorund 98%)
under the random padding framework.
Figure 5.11 demonstrates the adversarial resistance property of our random padding
framework. When there is no input padding (P = 46), all the models’ detection performances
drop to below 15%. However, with the increase of padding number P , the detection recall
increases significantly and trends become stable to specific ranges. From the figure, we can
learn that the FNN and RNN perform better than CNN in adversarial resistance. The best
performance of FNN is 79.7% (P = 70), and for RNN and CNN is 89.5% (P = 64) and 71.8%
(P = 70) respectively. Overall, our framework can remarkably increase the robustness of the
DNNs in FDIA detection compared with previous state-of-the-art approaches.
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92

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Works
In this dissertation, we investigate the potential security problems of employing deep learning
techniques in cyber-physical system applications.

6.1

Conclusions

In chapter 2, we study the data privacy issues in cloud-assisted CPS data storage systems. We
propose a practical searchable symmetric scheme that enables the user to query keywords
from the encrypted ciphertext data. Compared with previous typical SSE methods, our
scheme achieves high space-efficiency with little information disclosure that is tolerated for
practical CPS applications.
In chapter 3, we study the adversarial machine learning in customer domain CPS
applications with the DNN-based energy theft detection.

We summarize the specific

properties of the adversarial attacks and propose a practical threat model.

We then

propose the SearchFromFree framework which contains a random initialization scheme to
maximize the attacker’s profit and a step-size iterative scheme to increase the transferability
of adversarial measurements. The evaluation based on a real-world smart meter dataset
shows that our framework allows the adversarial attacker to report extremely low power
consumption data to the utilities without being detected by the well-trained DNN models.
In chapter 4, we study adversarial machine learning in control domain CPS applications.
From the attacker’s perspective, we find that the control domain CPS applications propose
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more challenges for the adversarial attacker.

The main constraints are 1) knowledge

constraints that prevent the attacker learning the measurements of uncompromised sensors
and 2) physical constraint that requires the adversarial examples to follow the inner
constraints defined by the physical system among the sensors. We then propose ConAML,
a framework for adversarial attacks to control domain CPS applications. We evaluate the
ConAML framework with three different applications and the result shows our framework
enables the attacker to generate effective adversarial examples under practical constraints.
In chapter 5, we investigate the defense mechanisms of adversarial attacks. We evaluate
the performance of several state-of-the-art defense mechanisms, including adversarial
detection, adversarial training, and input reconstruction. However, we find that they have
intrinsic limitations on defending against control domain adversarial attacks. To solve this,
we propose a random padding framework to increase the robustness of DNNs. The evaluation
based on both customer domain application (energy theft detection) and control domain
application (FDIA detection) shows that our framework is resistant to white-box adversarial
attack and outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches.

6.2

Future Research Directions

Based on the recent research on CPS security, we summarize the potential research directions:
• The SSE proposed in this dissertation can also be evaluated with other CPS
applications whose data requires high-level privacy, such as medical CPSs.
• A more accurate and reliable deep learning-based incident detection model is needed.
The current models can only indicate incidents of a highway, and more accurate models
that indicate the specific incident location will be studied in the future.
• The adversarial examples are inevitable as long as the DNNs are not perfect. Therefore,
more practical security solutions for practical CPS deep learning applications should
be studied. An example of the preferred solution can be specific sensor protection
schemes.
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